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Technological Exceptionalism After
Carpenter: A Case Study on Hash-Value
Matching
Denae Kassotis*
The Fourth Amendment has long served as a barrier between
the police and the people; ensuring the government acts
reasonably in combating crime. Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
is more dynamic than other constitutional guarantees, and has
undergone periodic shifts to account for technological and cultural
changes. The Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in United States v.
Carpenter marks the most recent jurisprudential shift, as the Court
departed from the well-settled reasonable expectation of privacy
test to account for a new technology (CSLI records). This Note
examines Carpenter’s impact on future Fourth Amendment cases,
using another novel surveillance technique, hash-value matching,
as a case study. Hash-value matching is a binary authentication
method that can scan billions of digital communications in seconds
for evidence of contraband.
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INTRODUCTION
Have you ever wondered how your email account verifies that
you have entered the correct password when you attempt to log-in?
Websites that require a user to log-in with a password keep a
repository of hash-values corresponding to passwords that unlock
specific user’s accounts.1 When a user first creates their password,
the alphanumeric string they enter is run through a hash algorithm,
converting it into a shortened output with a fixed length.2 This
output, known as the password’s hash-value, is then saved by the
website.3 When a user later attempts to log-in with the same input,
the input will again be run through the hash-algorithm to create a
hash-value.4 If the hash-value for the attempted log-in matches the
stored hash-value, corresponding to the password initially entered,
the user will be allowed to proceed into the account.5 Moreover,
since websites store password’s hash-values, which cannot be
converted back to the passwords they correspond to, even if their
repository of hashes was hacked, a hacker would not be able to
retrieve the desired passwords.6
The process used to verify passwords is called data-exposure.7
Data-exposure refers to a model where an entity keeps a repository
of hash-values corresponding to known inputs (such as correct
passwords), and compares unknown inputs (such as attempted
passwords) against the repository to “expose” a match.8 If an
unknown input matches a known hash-value, it is certain that the

1

Understanding Password Authentication & Password Cracking,
https://www.wordfence.com/learn/how-passwords-work-andWORDFENCE,
cracking-passwords/ [https://perma.cc/9GUQ-EV9E] (last updated June 25,
2018).
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
See id.
7
Cf. Richard P. Salgado, Fourth Amendment Search and the Power of the
Hash, 119 HARV. L. REV. 38, 43 (2005) (defining data exposure as matching an
unknown set of hash-values against a known hash list to reveal particular files.);
see also infra Introduction.
8
Id.
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unknown input is the same as the input that created the known
hash-value.9
Safe password storage is one of many innocuous uses of data
exposure. For example, law enforcement can compare a suspect’s
hard-drive against a customized hash-list to look for files stolen
during an intrusion, or for pirated software not yet released to the
public.10 These examples refer to a targeted government search of
lawfully acquired private property for digital contraband. But, law
enforcement is not the only entity with access to hashing software.
In fact, conglomerates like Microsoft hash every file sent through
their network for evidence of child pornography.11 Social giants
such as Facebook, Twitter, Microsoft, and YouTube hash user
content to thwart the distribution of terrorist content and curtail
protest activity.12 ISPs like AT&T have discussed hashing user
data to identify copyright infringing music or movies shared
among friends.13 Moreover, private companies are encouraged,
both by law and social norms, to turn over evidence of hashmatches to law enforcement. Although it is in society’s best
interest for law enforcement to receive much of this evidence,
where is the line drawn? Furthermore, is the Fourth Amendment
triggered when private actors systematically share evidence with
the government?
9

Id. at 40.
Id. at 43.
11
See United States v. Reddick, No. 2:16-CR-928, 2017 WL 1353803, at *3
(S.D. Tex. Apr. 13, 2017).
12
Kalev Leetaru, Can We Finally Stop Terrorists from Exploiting Social
(Oct.
9,
2018,
7:01
PM),
Media?,
FORBES
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kalevleetaru/2018/10/09/can-we-finally-stopterrorists-from-exploiting-social-media/#7ce5faae6d80 [https://perma.cc/8SNYR9WL]; Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter, and YouTube Provide Update on Global
Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism, MICROSOFT CORP. BLOGS (Dec. 4, 2017),
https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/12/04/facebook-microsofttwitter-and-youtube-provide-update-on-global-internet-forum-to-counterterrorism/ [https://perma.cc/A6BS-24XM].
13
See Brad Stone, AT&T and Other I.S.P.’s May Be Getting Ready to Filter,
TIMES:
BITS
BLOG
(Jan.
8,
2008,
7:07
PM),
N.Y.
https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/01/08/att-and-other-isps-may-be-gettingready-to-filter/ [https://perma.cc/E676-Q6D2]; see, e.g., In re United States of
America’s Application for a Search Warrant to Seize and Search Elec. Devices
from Edward Cunnius, 770 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1152 (W.D. Wash. 2011).
10
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This Note proceeds in three Parts. It assesses the impact of
United States v. Carpenter on Fourth Amendment rights by
exploring the admissibility of hash-match evidence of child
pornographic images, that are intercepted by a private actor and
shared with the government via statutory mandate. Part I of this
Note introduces hash-value matching technology and explores the
effect of hashing, as well as other information age technologies, on
information privacy. Next, Part I discusses the regulatory shortcomings of the federal law’s ability to govern information privacy.
Finally, it analyzes the private and binary search doctrines and
discusses the state of Fourth Amendment doctrine before and after
Carpenter.
Part II further unpacks the Carpenter decision and its impact
on a Court reviewing an “exceptional” technology under the
Fourth Amendment. Part II also proposes a new framework to
determine if a technology is exceptional, meaning that technology
should not be analogized to previous technologies of its kind. In
determining technological exceptionalism, this Note proposes an
inquiry into whether a technology is fundamentally different from
others of its kind, and whether the technology is “much less costly”
for the government to employ. Moreover, this Note proposes that if
a technology meets the definition of “exceptional,” it causes a
rights-shift. A rights-shift occurs when the low cost of a new
surveillance method allows the government to engage in a
surveillance activity it was once precluded from. A rights-shift
disrupts the balance struck by the Fourth Amendment between law
enforcement and citizens. This Note proposes that in response to
an unbalanced Fourth Amendment, courts should follow Justice
Robert’s approach in Riley and Carpenter and holistically assess
the technology at issue. Further, in the rare circumstance that a
technology is deemed exceptional, courts should look at the totality
of the circumstances in assessing the diminution in privacy caused
by the technology, and avoid rigidly applying the reasonable
expectation of privacy test. Finally, Part III assesses the Fourth
Amendment implications of hash-value matching pursuant to the
framework proposed in Part II.
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I. OVERVIEW OF HASH-VALUE MATCHING, INTERNET
GOVERNANCE, AND INFORMATION PRIVACY
A. Hash-Value Matching
Hashing is a common forensic technique used to analyze
digital images taken from a computer.14 It is “the process of taking
an input data string from an electronic [file] and using a
mathematical function to generate a (usually smaller) output
string.”15 The output string, called the hash-value,16 is a “digital
fingerprint” shared by any duplicate of the input data string.17 Any
two iterations of the same file will, with over ninety-nine percent
accuracy, produce the same hash-value.18 Thus, hash-values are
uniquely associated with the input data, such that, “if an unknown
file has a hash-value identical to that of another known file, then [it
is clear] that the first file is the same as the second.”19 One of the
advantages of hashing software is the ability to scan a large
number of electronic files for their hash-values in very little time,
and, do so without exposing the underlying image corresponding to
the hash to third-party viewers.20
The cryptographic, or “one-way,” hash algorithm, referred to in
this Note, is impossible to reverse—that is, to turn the hash-value
14

See United States v. Miller, No. 16-47-DLB-CJS, 2017 WL 2705963, at *1
(E.D. Ky. June 23, 2017).
15
Id. (citing Salgado, supra note 8, at 38–39).
16
The terms “hash” and “hash-value” are interchangeable and will be used
interchangeably throughout this paper. Forensic Use of Hash Values and
Associated Hash Algorithms, NETH. FORENSIC INST. 2 (Jan. 2018),
https://www.forensischinstituut.nl/binaries/nfi/documenten/publicaties/2018/02/
13/vakbijlage-forensisch-gebruik-van-bestandskenmerken-en-bijbehorendehashalgoritmen/Supplement-hashes-v2018_01a_English.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2M6F-T33E].
17
Miller, 2017 WL 2705963, at *1. With respect to images and videos,
hashing software breaks them down into bits of data, and assigns that data
alphanumeric values based on the image’s hue gradient. The resulting string of
numbers is the image’s hash-value. Since a hash-value is derived from each
“bit” of data, and its placement relative to other bits, it is intimately associated
with the image. See NETH. FORENSIC INST., supra note 16, at 2.
18
United States v. Reddick, No. 2:16-CR-928, 2017 WL 1353803, at *1 (S.D.
Tex. Apr. 13, 2017).
19
Miller, 2017 WL 2705963, at *1.
20
Reddick, 2017 WL 1353803, at *2.
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back into the underlying image it identifies.21 Moreover, it is
practically impossible22 to find two files that have different content
but the same hash value.23
1. Detecting Child Pornography
Hashing has an array of forensic purposes, including the
identification, verification, and authentication of data.24 One such
purpose, known as “data exposure” or hash-value matching,25 is
the process of matching a hash-set26 associated with an
individual’s files against a known hash set to reveal particular
files.27 Hash-value matching can accurately and expeditiously
identify whether a computer contains known digital contraband.28
This Note specifically addresses the use of hash-value matching to
determine whether a suspect’s computer contains child
pornographic images, and the subsequent use of such hash
evidence at a criminal trial.
The advent of the internet provided a new means for trafficking
child pornography.29 In response to the ever-increasing use of
internet communication, Congress created a statutory scheme to
identify digital files containing child pornography, which conferred
21

NETH. FORENSIC INST., supra note 16, at 3.
In this context, “practically impossible” can be read as “even when all the
computing power of the world could be used simultaneously, it is still
impossible.” Id. at 3 n.4.
23
Id. at 3.
24
See generally Salgado, supra note 8, at 43.
25
Hash-value matching is the process of matching a media hash set against a
known hash set to reveal particular files. This process is also known as data
exposure. Id. For purposes of this Note, which focuses on the use of hashvalues, the aforementioned process is generally referred to as “hashing.” See id.
26
In this context, a “hash-set” refers colloquially to the list of hash-values
associated with an individual’s files. See NETH. FORENSIC INST., supra note 16,
at 2.
27
See id.
28
See id.
29
Alexandra L. Mitter, Deputizing Internet Service Providers: How the
Government Avoids Fourth Amendment Protections, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM.
L. 235, 241 (2011) (“Before the advent of the Internet, production and
reproduction of pornographic images involving children were extremely difficult
and expensive, and the sale and distribution of those images were similarly risky
endeavors.”).
22
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broad investigative powers on federal and local government.30
Congress’s response was swift and effective, in part because its
legislation capitalized on the unique position of electronic
communication service providers (“ECSPs”), specifically, Internet
Service Providers (“ISPs”).31 Although this scheme has been
efficient in reducing the spread of child pornography, it implicates
Fourth Amendment and information privacy concerns for every
individual who communicates digitally.32 The following Section
discusses hashing’s central role in the statutory framework
curtailing the spread of digital contraband.33
2. The Reporting Dynamic Between ECSPs and Law
Enforcement
Pursuant to the Crime Prevention Act of 1990, “[a] person
who, while engaged in a professional capacity . . . learns of facts
that give reason to suspect that a child has suffered an incident of
child abuse . . . and fails to make a timely report” can face a fine or
imprisonment.34 Further, the PROTECT (“Providing Resources,
Officers, and Technology to Eradicate Cyber Threats”) Our
Children Act provides that any electronic communication service
(“ECS”)35 or remote computing service (“RCS”) provider that

30

See 18 U.S.C. § 2258A(a) (2012).
See generally Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 5
U. ILL. L. REV. 1417 (2009); infra Part I.A.3.
32
See infra Part III. Per a 2018 study, there will be over 3.8 billion email users
before the start of 2019. That is over half of the world’s population. Heinz
Tschabitscher, How Many Email Users are There?, LIFEWIRE,
https://www.lifewire.com/how-many-email-users-are-there-1171213
[https://perma.cc/SF3K-NZE3] (last updated Dec. 16, 2018).
33
See, e.g., Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act of 1988
[CPOEA], Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4485 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 2251 (2006)); Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified in scattered sections of Titles 18 and 42
U.S.C.); PROTECT Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650, 676–86
(codified in scattered sections of Title 18 U.S.C.) (“Prosecutorial Remedies and
Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today”).
34
42 U.S.C. § 13031 (2012); see, e.g., United States v. Stratton, 229 F. Supp.
3d 1230, 1233 (D. Kan. 2017).
35
“‘[E]lectronic communication service’ means any service which provides to
users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications.”
18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2012).
31
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obtains actual knowledge of an image depicting child pornography
is required to provide a report to the National Center for Missing
and Exploited Children’s (“NCMEC”) CyberTipline36 “as soon as
reasonably possible.”37
Moreover, “[m]any [ECS] providers, desiring to avoid any
reputation for aiding those who possess or transmit child
pornography, use [hashing software] to scan files that customers
upload through the service providers’ browsers, applications, or
cloud storage facilities.”38 Major ECSPs, such as Microsoft,
compare hash-values generated from user content that correspond
to confirmed images of child pornography.39 Hash-values saved in
the NCMEC repository or similar database are compared with the
hash-values of files transmitted or stored on an ECSP’s server by
its automated hashing software.40 Pursuant to the PROTECT Act,
if a provider gets a match, the provider must refer the files, along
with the sender’s subscriber information, to NCMEC.41 NCMEC
operates a database that serves as the central repository of hashvales for confirmed images depicting child pornography.42

36

NCMEC launched its CyberTipline in 1998 to help battle the sexual
exploitation of children by providing the public and ECS providers with the
ability to report online instances of exploitation. CyberTipline, NAT’L CTR. FOR
MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILD., www.missingkids.com/gethelpnow/cybertipline
[https://perma.cc/4P3P-VZDW] (last visited Jan. 30, 2019).
37
18 U.S.C. § 2258A(a)(1) (2012).
38
United States v. Reddick, No. 2:16-CR-928, 2017 WL 1353803, at *2 (S.D.
Tex. Apr. 13, 2017). “Google, has been using its proprietary hashing technology
since 2008 to identify ‘confirmed child sexual abuse images.’ After an image of
child sexual abuse is viewed ‘by at least one Google employee,’ the image ‘is
given a digital fingerprint (hash)’ and is added to Google’s repository of hashes
of apparent child pornography as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2256.” United States v.
Miller, No. 16-47-DLB-CJS, 2017 WL 2705963, at *1 (E.D. Ky. June 23,
2017). “AOL’s automated filter works by identifying the hash values of images
attached to emails sent through its mail servers. Those values are then compared
to the hash values of images that AOL employees have viewed previously and
deemed child pornography. Any email containing an image with a matching
hash value is automatically weeded out.” United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d
1292, 1294 (10th Cir. 2016).
39
Reddick, 2017 WL 1353803 at *2.
40
Id.
41
See id. at *3; 18 U.S.C. § 2258(A).
42
Reddick, 2017 WL 1353803, at *2.
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After an ECSP submits a report to the CyberTipline, NCMEC,
viewing the hash-value only, generates its own report.43 NCMEC
then conducts an initial investigation, limited to confirming the
hash-value match and identifying the location of the internet user
whose equipment uploaded the matching file.44 Finally, NCMEC
forwards the report to the law enforcement agency with
jurisdiction over the internet user.45 Further, the internal policies of
most ECSP’s regarding the use of proprietary hashing software
contemplate that a human employee will confirm that the image
depicts child pornography before a report is submitted to
NCMEC.46
Litigation arising from this dynamic principally consists of
criminal defendants arguing that this scheme violates their Fourth
Amendment rights.47 However, at least before Carpenter, the
intermediary role of ECSPs, results in the dismissal of almost all
Fourth Amendment challenges. The following Subsection
discusses issues concerning ISPs as information intermediaries.

43

See id. at *3.
See id.
45
See id.
46
See Partnering to Help Curb Spread of Online Terrorist Content,
FACEBOOK NEWSROOM
(Dec.
5,
2016),
https://newsroom.fb.com
/news/2016/12/partnering-to-help-curb-spread-of-online-terrorist-content/
[https://perma.cc/KA8E-6J6U] (describing Facebook’s use of hashing software
to remove violent terrorist imagery and its policy to review material that
matches a hash-value known to depict terrorist content before automatically
removing the material); supra note 38 and accompanying text. For example,
Google maintains a repository of apparent child pornography, as defined by 18
U.S.C. § 2256, which consists of images that have been determined to depict
child pornography by “at least one Google employee.” When Google encounters
a hash that matches a hash of a known child sexual abuse image, it undertakes a
manual human review to confirm the image contains child pornography. The
typical process looks like Google’s proprietary hashing software. See United
States v. Miller, No. 16-47-DLB-CJS, 2017 WL 2705963, at *1 (E.D. Ky. June
23, 2017).
47
See e.g., Miller, 2017 WL 2705963.
44
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3. The Crucial Role of an ISP in Obtaining Hash Evidence
An ISP,48 subject to the reporting requirements of the
PROTECT Our Children Act,49 has a unique and crucial role in
routing its user’s communications to the rest of the world.50 An ISP
owns the point on the network between a user’s computer and the
rest of the internet—the only point through which all the user’s
communications must pass.51 This chokepoint allows ISPs to
engage in large scale surveillance of its users, accessing more
information than any other type of electronic service provider—
even Google.52 Since ISPs are the “gateway,” or first-step, to the
48
An internet service provider is a “company that provides internet
connections and services to individuals and organizations. In addition to
providing access to the Internet, ISPs may also provide software packages (such
as browsers), e-mail accounts, and a personal Web site or home page.” Internet
Service
Provider,
ENCYC. BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com
/technology/Internet-service-provider
[https://perma.cc/LQ26-5AA6]
(last
visited Apr. 15, 2019).
49
ISPs meet the statutory definition of an ECSP under the PROTECT Our
Children Act. 18 U.S.C. §2258(a) (2012) (defining “reporting requirements of
providers.”) Courts have struggled to correctly classify different electronic
communications providers. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357,
360 (4th Cir. 2010) (labeling AOL an internet service provider). However, the
text and spirit of the PROTECT Act and judicial precedent indicate that ISPs are
the exact entity Congress intended to subject to reporting requirements. In
general, due to network design, a user’s communication must pass through a
“privileged network bottleneck” controlled by his ISP to reach other internet
users or sites. Put differently, “a user cannot say anything to Google without
saying it first to his ISP, and an ISP can [] hear everything a user says to other
websites like Facebook.” Ohm, supra note 31, at 1420. Thus, ISPs have greater
access to electronically transmitted communications than any other electronic
service provider—even Google. See id. Ohm defines an ISP as a
“telecommunications compan[y] that route[s] communications to and from
Internet-connected computers.” Id. at 1420 n.1. This definition of ISP falls
squarely within the statutory definition of an ECS, i.e., “any service which
provides to users thereof the ability to send and receive wire or electronic
communications.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2012).
50
Ohm, supra note 31, at 1423.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 1420. “Likewise, the ISP can scrutinize communications sent to
almost all of Google’s other services. Every time a user adds an appointment to
his Google Calendar, sends or receives an e-mail message through Gmail, reads
blogs using Google Reader, edits a word processing document in Google Docs,
or views a video in Google-owned YouTube, his computer sends copies of his
messages, requests, and behavior first through his ISP.” Id. at 1440.
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Internet, “almost any communication sent to anybody online” is
accessible first by an ISP.53 Further, by imposing reporting
obligations on ISPs and immunizing them from suit, Congress both
recognized and ratified their unique enforcement role.54
In the early days of the internet, ISPs conducted broad
automated monitoring of their user’s communications for business
purposes, such as gauging the health of the network, detecting
spam, and policing bandwidth.55 Such automated monitoring was
relatively non-invasive, since ISPs preserved privacy by “keeping
a shallow, limited view” of user’s communications.56
However, sparse legal constraints on ISPs, incentive to
monetize user data, and technological advances led to a shift in ISP
monitoring behavior in the 2000s.57 The combination of these
factors gave ISPs the motive and the means to deeply scrutinize
their user’s communications.58 First, after Google demonstrated the
efficacy of monetizing user behavior by displaying advertisements
targeted to user’s search queries, ISPs followed suit.59 Next, before
the early 2000s, network monitoring was constrained by the
relative slowness of computers and technological limitations on

53

Id. at 1438. “ISPs can view [user activity] across the Internet landscape,
seeing everything we do regardless of destination or application.” Additionally,
an ISP can view its user’s activities deeply, “because packet sniffers can store
everything.” Id.
54
18 U.S.C. §§ 2258(A)–2258(B) (2012). An ECSP who obtains actual
knowledge of child abuse must report it to NCMEC. 18 U.S.C. § 2258(A). No
civil claim or criminal charge may be brought against an ECSP arising from its
reporting responsibilities in any Federal or State court. 18 U.S.C. § 2258(B).
55
Ohm, supra note 31, at 1424.
56
Id.
57
See id. at 1425, 1427, 1432. Google, by displaying advertisements matching
user’s recent search inquiries, was the first ECSP to successfully monetize user’s
browsing behavior. Other ECSPs have attempted to follow suit and capitalize on
user’s behavioral data, a phenomenon known as “Google envy.” Id. at 1426.
58
Id. at 1432.
59
Id. at 1426. Arguably, ISPs were forced to find an additional source of
revenue in response to novel internet applications that required large amounts of
bandwidth and burdened existing network infrastructure. ISPs had to invest
significant capital in their infrastructure to support increased bandwidth, but
customers were unwilling to pay astronomical monthly fees to fund the increase.
Id. at 1425–26.
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monitoring hardware.60 Put differently, ISPs lacked the computing
horsepower to swiftly capture and analyze communications sent
across their networks.61 Professor Ohm62 analogizes the limitation
on pre-2000 network monitoring to a single police officer
monitoring traffic on the side of a country road.63 How thoroughly
the officer can scan the passing cars depends on two metrics: how
many cars drive by in a fixed time-period, and how quickly the
officer can scan each car.64 The first metric, the volume of traffic,
is akin to how many communications pass through a network
(bandwidth).65 The second, the officer’s efficiency, represents the
relative capabilities of network monitoring tools.66
Post-2000, the horsepower of internet monitoring software (the
officer’s efficiency) increased at a quicker rate than the network’s
bandwidth (the volume of traffic).67 Thus, a former technological
constraint on an ISP’s ability to monitor—the relative slowness of
monitoring software—is no longer in play.68 In contrast to the
single police officer alongside a country road, the post-2000
metaphor would involve several police officers, trained to work at
optimal efficiency, monitoring traffic with the help of radar guns.69
Moreover, although the country road is replaced by a busy
highway, the relative increase in the officers’ capabilities is greater
than the increase in traffic.70

60

Id. at 1427. Lawrence Lessig, a Harvard professor focusing on internet
governance and constitutional law, identified four regulators of online conduct
as: markets, norms, law, and technology. Id.
61
Id. at 1428.
62
Paul Ohm is the Associate Dean for Academic Affairs at Georgetown Law.
He specializes in information privacy, computer crime law, intellectual property,
and criminal procedure. Paul Ohm, GEO. LAW, https://www.law.georgetown.edu
/faculty/paul-ohm/ [https://perma.cc/56E9-WT88] (last visited Jan. 30, 2019).
63
Ohm, supra note 31, at 1428.
64
See id.
65
See id.
66
See id. at 1430.
67
Cf. id. at 1430–31.
68
Cf. id.
69
See id. at 1428–31.
70
Id. at 1427–28.
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Finally, lawmakers swiftly recognized the unique and
important role of ISPs in combating crime.71 Thus, following
pressure from law enforcement agencies, Congress vested ISPs
with certain responsibilities and immunities to assist law
enforcement.72 Relatedly, there are sparse federal protections over
private information held by ISPs and other third-parties.73 The
resulting framework grants ISP’s the broad ability to monitor
network traffic and gather user information. Moreover, it affords
law enforcement easy access to the stored consumer-data.74
4. Federal Framework Regulating Information Privacy
The United States lacks a comprehensive data security law
regulating the collection and use of personal data on the federal
level.75 Instead, states and independent agencies are tasked with
regulating the collection and use of personal data.76 The result is a
non-standardized, “patchwork” system of incongruent laws that
cannot efficiently regulate consumer privacy.77
Moreover, there is no federal law governing mass collection of
private information.78 The modest federal protections on consumer
data come from the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), which
has overseen privacy regulations since the 1970s.79 Pursuant to
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTCA”), the
FTC is authorized to “prohibit[] unfair or deceptive acts in the

71

Id. at 1426–27.
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2258(A) (2012).
73
See generally Ieuan Jolly, Data Protection in the United States: Overview,
THOMSON REUTERS PRAC. L. (Oct. 1, 2018), https://content.next.westlaw.com
/Document/I02064fbd1cb611e38578f7ccc38dcbee/View/FullText.html?context
Data=(sc.Default)&transitionType=Default&firstPage=true&bhcp=1
[https://perma.cc/F66C-ZF7J].
74
See generally id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
See generally id.
78
Id.
79
Cheryl Wang, Information Privacy and Data Security Laws: An Ineffective
Regulatory Framework, COLUM. UNDERGRADUATE L. REV. (Oct. 31, 2017),
http://blogs.cuit.columbia.edu/culr/2017/10/31/information-privacy-and-datasecurity-laws-an-inefficient-regulatory-framework/#_ftn3
[https://perma.cc/F2HC-6KYZ].
72
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marketplace”—which allows it modest regulatory power over data
collection practices.80 However, the FTC’s enforcement authority
is limited, exemplified by its high profile action involving
Levnovo, one of the world’s largest personal computer (“PC”)
manufacturers, and Superfish, a browser-based advertising
company, in 2017.81
Between 2014 and 2015, Lenovo pre-installed Superfish’s adinjecting software (called “Visual Discovery”) on all its
computers.82 This “man-in-the-middle” technique allowed
Superfish access to user’s sensitive data—including social security
numbers, financial account information, login information, and
emails—by establishing Visual Discovery as a local proxy between
a user’s PC and the websites they visited.83 Lenovo and Superfish
made profited off of this scheme.84 In response, the FTC charged
Lenovo with deceptively failing to “disclose adequately, that
VisualDiscovery would act as a man-in-the-middle” and for
unfairly preinstalling the software without notice to consumers.85 It
thus follows that, if another company disclosed its “man-in-themiddle” software to consumers, such an action would likely be
outside the regulatory authority of the FTC.86 Moreover,
exemplified by the FTC’s “roundabout” way of holding Lenovo
liable, it can only regulate to prohibit market inequities—it cannot
regulate the mass collection of data in the first instance.87 The
FTC’s limited authority is the major federal regulation concerning
data privacy; leaving most mass data collection completely
unchecked.88
80
Privacy and Data Security Update (2016), FED. TRADE COMM’N (Jan.
2017), https://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy-data-security-update-2016#how
[https://perma.cc/Z6X4-DHDT].
81
See Wang, supra note 79.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
See id.
87
See generally id.
88
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012) (authorizing the FTC to declare unlawful
“unfair” or “deceptive” acts affecting interstate commerce.); see also FED.
TRADE COMM’N, FTC Releases 2018 Privacy and Data Security Update,
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/03/ftc-releases-2018-
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Additionally, in early 2017, the Trump administration signed a
Congressional resolution repealing an Obama-FCC rule that would
have required ISPs obtain explicit consumer permission before
sharing or selling sensitive information.89 The resolution allows
ISPs, which are treated differently than other communication
providers, to collect, store, share, and sell certain types of data,
including location information, browsing history, and app-usage
data, without a user’s consent.90 Thus, ISPs can, and do, store
massive amounts of user information for a variety of business
purposes, with essentially no legal hurdles.91
In addition to sparse regulation concerning monitoring and
storing consumer data, federal law does not effectively prevent the
disclosure of stored information. The primary statute regulating
disclosure of electronically stored information is the Stored
Communications Act (“SCA”).92 The SCA was enacted in 1986, in
response to the judicially crafted third-party doctrine,93 in an
attempt to protect individuals’ private communications held in
electronic storage by ECSPs.94 Congress tailored the SCA to
electronic communications sent via and stored by third-parties by
establishing that “a person or entity providing an electronic
communication service to the public shall not knowingly divulge
to any person or entity the contents of a communication while in

privacy-data-security-update [https://perma.cc/X39X-THSD] (Mar. 15, 2019)
(“[t]he Federal Trade Commission [is] the nation’s primary privacy and data
security enforcer.”)
89
Kaveh Waddell, Encryption Won’t Stop Your Internet Provider from Spying
on You, ATLANTIC (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com
/technology/archive/2017/03/encryption-wont-stop-your-internet-provider-fromspying-on-you/521208/ [https://perma.cc/93CK-TYS2].
90
Chris Ciaccia, How Will ISPs Collect and Sell Your Browser History, FOX
NEWS (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.foxnews.com/tech/how-will-isps-collectand-sell-your-browser-history [https://perma.cc/TVS9-UP9C].
91
See id.
92
See generally Michael E. Lackey & Oral D. Pottinger, Stored
Communications Act: Practical Considerations, LEXIS PRAC. ADVISOR J. (June
22,
2018),
https://www.lexisnexis.com/lexis-practice-advisor/thejournal/b/lpa/archive/2018/06/22/stored-communications-act-practicalconsiderations.aspx [https://perma.cc/7L48-JX8F].
93
See infra Part I.C.1; see Lackey & Pottinger, supra note 92.
94
18 U.S.C. §§ 2703–06 (2012).
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electronic storage by that service.”95 Despite its modest
protections, the SCA allows the government to compel an ECSP to
disclose “a record or other information pertaining to a . . .
customer” by court order.96 Such an order (a “§ 2703(d) Order”)
allows law enforcement to circumvent the warrant requirement and
access user data without facing traditional constitutional hurdles.97
Moreover, the SCA does not provide a suppression remedy.98
Thus, even if law enforcement garners evidence in violation of the
SCA, the information at issue will still see its day in court.99 The
ease with which law enforcement can obtain a § 2703(d) Order
illuminates a “loophole” around constitutional safeguards that the
government capitalizes on when a target’s data is stored by a thirdparty.100
95

18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1) (2012). The SCA carves out several exceptions to
this general rule—one of which, created by the 2008 PROTECT Our Children
Act, allows disclosure “to the [NCMEC], in connection with a report submitted
thereto under [§] 2258A.” 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(6).
96
18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)–(d). Under the SCA, only a non-content
communication can be obtained via a § 2703(d) order. Since Carpenter does not
acknowledge the “content/non-content” distinction emphasized by the SCA,
discussed infra, this Note does not dive deeply into the distinction. See
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018) (reasoning that if email
content received Fourth Amendment protection, the constitutional safeguard
should also apply to CSLI data (meta-data)). The Carpenter Court also
compared the privacy interest in CSLI, non-content data, to a privacy interest in
physical letters held by a mail carrier and emails held by an ISP. Id. at 2230
(citing Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877) (letters held by mail carrier);
United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 28388 (6th Cir. 2010) (e-mails held
by Internet service provider)).
97
See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).
98
See Orin S. Kerr, Lifting the “Fog” of Internet Surveillance: How a
Suppression Remedy Would Change Computer Crime Law, 54 HASTINGS L.J.
805, 820 (2003).
99
Id.
100
Orin S. Kerr, Does Carpenter Revolutionize the Law of Subpoenas?,
LAWFARE (June 26, 2018, 6:44 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/doescarpenter-revolutionize-law-subpoenas
[https://perma.cc/7CAY-XGXQ].
Criminal procedure allows for two types of compulsory process: a warrant or a
subpoena. The first path, a warrant, allows officers to physically enter a
particularly described location and take any evidence they find, subject to the
warrant’s terms. Search warrants are regulated by the Fourth Amendment, which
provides several constitutional safeguards on what can be searched; the most
notable being the probable cause and reasonableness requirements.
Alternatively, law enforcement can gather evidence through an administrative
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Further, ECSPs, unlike government actors, are not subject to
constitutional constraints.101 Therefore, when evidence of criminal
activity is obtained by an ECSP and turned over to law
enforcement, the methods used to obtain that evidence are not
subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny.102 Additionally, if a
government search is preceded by a private search, such as one by
an ECSP, the search will not trigger constitutional protections.103
The unique ability of a private entity to access sensitive
consumer information, combined with the dynamic between law
enforcement and ECSPs, has hindered the Fourth Amendment’s
ability to protect privately held user information. This Note
proposes a new Fourth Amendment framework for circumstances
where law enforcement uses novel technologies to capitalize on
private electronic information. The following Section discusses the
Fourth Amendment and current framework for protecting such
information.
B. The Fourth Amendment’s Role in Protecting Information
Privacy
The Fourth Amendment is our constitutional guarantee to be
free from arbitrary government intrusion.104 But, in the context of
hashing, an ECSP’s role as an intermediary between an individual
and law enforcement renders most hash-evidence turned over to
the government presumptively lawful under the private search

subpoena—which has similar requirements to a § 2703(d) Order. Unlike a
warrant, a subpoena recipient is tasked with personally gathering the requested
evidence. Since compliance with a subpoena implies certain statements—that
the requested records exist, you possess the records, and you believe they are
authentic—a recipient can claim his Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination in response to the subpoena. Although the Fourth Amendment
applies to a subpoena recipient, the protection is modest, and only allows the
recipient to challenge the subpoena for being overbroad or unduly burdensome.
101
United States v. Miller, No. 16-47-DLB-CJS, 2017 WL 2705963, at *2
(E.D. Ky. June 23, 2017) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment protects individuals from
‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ by the government, not private entities.”).
102
Id. “The Fourth Amendment ‘is wholly inapplicable’ to searches and
seizures by ‘a private individual not acting as an agent of the Government.’” Id.
103
See infra Part I.C.2.
104
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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doctrine.105 Additionally, courts have held that surveillance
techniques that reveal information in the binary (such as hashing)
do not infringe an objective expectation of privacy when law
enforcement detects contraband.106 Subsequently, all but one court
addressing the Fourth Amendment implications of hash-evidence
held that law enforcement’s warrantless use of the evidence,
obtained from an ECSP, was constitutional.107
However, the Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Carpenter v.
United States fundamentally altered the constitutional framework
for assessing the fit of novel technologies within preexisting
Fourth Amendment doctrine.108 In doing so, the Court cast doubt
on the propriety of the third-party doctrine; which has
reverberating effects on how the Fourth Amendment will be
applied in the digital age.109
Although Carpenter marks a shift away from established
Fourth Amendment principles, it is not the first time the Court has
reevaluated how the amendment should be applied.110 Moreover,
the Fourth Amendment is dynamic and subject to periodic
reevaluation as technology advances.111 The following Subsection
provides background on the Supreme Court’s struggle to
consistently apply the Fourth Amendment through shifting
constitutional jurisprudence and technological advances.

105

Cf. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
Hash searches, like dog sniffs, provide information in binary: Either yes, the
hash value of some file on a suspect’s computer matches the hash value of some
known piece of child pornography, or no, it does not. See Illinois v. Caballes,
543 U.S. 405, 408–09 (2005); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983);
infra Part I.C.4.
107
See, e.g., United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1306–08 (10th Cir.
2016); United States v. Miller, No. 16-47-DLB-CJS, 2017 WL 2705963, at *8
(E.D. Ky. June 23, 2017); United States v. Reddick, 900 F.3d 636 (5th Cir.
2018). But see United States v. Crist, 627 F. Supp. 2d 575, 585 (M.D. Pa. 2008).
108
See generally Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
109
Id.
110
See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012); Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
111
See generally Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the
Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476 (2011).
106
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1. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test
The Fourth Amendment protects “the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures.112 The Supreme Court has
recognized that the “basic purpose” of the Fourth amendment “is to
safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary
invasions by governmental officials.”113 However, for much of
Fourth Amendment history, whether a government surveillance
technique was deemed a “search,” subject to constitutional
scrutiny, was tied to common law trespass and focused on whether
the government “obtain[ed] information by physically intruding []
a constitutionally protected area.”114
Then, in response to law enforcement’s rampant use of
wiretaps, the Court reshaped Fourth Amendment protections by
stating that the Fourth Amendment applies “to people, not places,”
and therefore is triggered when the government accesses
information that an individual reasonably expects to remain
private.115 Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz set forth a two-step
test for determining whether an individual possesses a reasonable
expectation of privacy (“REP”) in what is searched or seized.116
First, an individual must have an actual, subjective expectation of
privacy (“subjective prong”).117 Second, one’s subjective
expectation must be recognized by society as reasonable
(“objective prong.”)118 Existing customs, social policies, and
norms determine which privacy expectations are objectively
reasonable.119
Since Katz, the Supreme Court has grounded its Fourth
Amendment decisions in whether an individual possessed a

112

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
114
Jones, 565 U.S. at 406 n.3.
115
Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
116
Id. at 361–63 (Harlan, J., concurring).
117
Id. at 361.
118
Id.
119
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 787 (1981) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(privacy expectations reflect the customs and values of the existing society).
113
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REP.120 However, courts and scholars121 alike have criticized a
privacy-centric approach to Fourth Amendment protection in an
era of significantly diminished privacy.122 Moreover, the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Carpenter cast considerable doubt on the REP
framework, which in turn has weakened the foundation on which
doctrines grounded in a REP stand.123
The following sub-section begins by discussing the flaws of a
privacy-centric approach to Fourth Amendment protection in an
era where private corporations comprehensively track and share
consumer behavior data.124 Next, it analyzes the Carpenter Court’s
decision to deviate from a route application of the REP test, and
focus on the class of information sought instead of the actions of
law enforcement.125 Third, it analyzes the third-party doctrine,
which the Carpenter Court ruled does not extend to CSLI collected
for more than seven days. Fourth, it examines the private search
doctrine, a sub-set of the third-party doctrine. Finally, it considers
the binary search doctrine. The following discussion of Fourth
Amendment doctrine highlights Carpenter’s powerful impact on
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, far beyond the narrow factpattern before the Court.

120

See e.g., United States v. Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); United States v.
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
121
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018); Riley v. California, 134
S. Ct. 2473 (2014); see generally Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World
Without Privacy, 81 MISS. L.J. 1309 (2012).
122
See generally Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without
Privacy, 81 MISS. L.J. 1309 (2012).
123
See generally Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206.
124
See Ohm, supra note 122, at 1310 (“Every year, companies, especially
those that deliver services online, spend millions of dollars developing new
services that track, store, and share the words, movements, and even the
thoughts of their customers. These invasive services have proved to be
irresistible to consumers, who have voluntarily embraced them in droves
launching a social age of self-revelation.”).
125
See generally Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206.
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2. An Objective, Privacy-Centric Approach in a “World
Without Privacy”
Courts have struggled to consistently apply both the subjective
and objective prongs of the REP test since its inception.126
Moreover, scholars have argued that the subjective component of
the test has become a “phantom doctrine”127—reducing Katz to a
“one step” inquiry: does society think it is reasonable to expect that
the information or item sought by the government will remain
private?128
The subjective prong of the REP test has lost its bite, because
courts treat it as an inquiry into whether the citizen, in her mind,
believed the information would remain private.129 For example, did
an individual actually believe that the content of her text messages,
sent with a government-issued pager, would remain private?130 The
problem with this inquiry is that it never seems to matter.131 A
criminal defendant will (and should) always argue that they
expected their information would be kept private from law
enforcement’s prying eye. Moreover, it is difficult to adduce
evidence rebutting a person’s self-reported mental state.132 Thus,
126

See Tom McInnis, The Changing Definition of Search or Seizure, 11
INSIGHTS ON L. & SOC’Y 10, 10–13 (2011) https://www.americanbar.org
/content/dam/aba/images
/public_education/presentations/ChangingDefinitionsofSearch.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J3LJ-ME84]. Although part of the Katz test is supposed to be
objective, without a standardized method for determining what personal
expectations of privacy society is willing to accept, the conclusion has been
depending on the shifting social and political views of the members of the Court.
Id. at 12. Compare Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that
the use of a thermal imaging device to monitor radiation of heat from a person’s
home requires a warrant), with California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986)
(holding that aerial surveillance of a home does not violate the Fourth
Amendment).
127
Orin S. Kerr, Katz Has Only One Step: The Irrelevance of Subjective
Expectations, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 113 (2015).
128
See generally id.
129
Id.
130
See City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010).
131
Paul Ohm, The Many Revolutions of Carpenter, 32 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
(forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 57).
132
This is not to say that a court will never find that a defendant lacked a
subjective expectation of privacy. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
742 (1979) (holding that it is doubtful “people in general entertain any actual
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the Court is almost never confronted with a scenario where the
subjective prong of the REP test fails, but the objective prong does
not.133
The Carpenter Court implicitly accepted the one-step approach
to Katz by ignoring the test’s subjective prong.134 The opinion
never mentioned the word “subjective,” nor did it attempt to divide
its analysis of the defendant’s subjective and objective
expectations of privacy.135 But, as Professor Ohm states
“Carpenter did not put a nail in the coffin of the subjective prong,
because it was interred six feet under long ago.”136
Further, premising Fourth Amendment protection solely on an
objective, societally recognized privacy expectation is concerning
in the digital era. Due to the vast amount of information Americans
share with third-parties as a pre-requisite to be productive
members of modern society,137 and the growth of the “internet of
things,”138 it can be argued that there are few categories of
expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial”). Similarly, the prosecution
very well may adduce sufficient evidence rebutting a defendant’s claim that they
actually expected their information to be kept private. See, e.g., id. (“All
telephone users realize that they must ‘convey’ phone numbers to the telephone
company, since it is through telephone company switching equipment that their
calls are completed. All subscribers realize, moreover, that the phone company
has facilities for making permanent records of the numbers they dial, for they
see a list of their long-distance (toll) calls on their monthly bills. In fact, pen
registers and similar devices are routinely used by telephone companies ‘for the
purposes of checking billing operations, detecting fraud and preventing
violations of law.’” (quoting United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 174–
75 (1977)).
133
See Ohm, supra note 131, at 56.
134
See generally Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
135
Ohm, supra note 131, at 57.
136
Id. at 58; see also Kerr, supra note 127, at 114 (explaining that the
subjective prong of the REP test was abandoned in the 1970s and 1980s).
137
See generally Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (holding that using a cellphone is
not “voluntary”); Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (emphasizing how
a cell phone is vital to participation in modern life.).
138
The Internet of Things (“IoT”) is the concept that almost any device with an
on and off switch can be connected to the internet and other devices. The IoT
thus makes up a network of connected devices and people. The analyst firm
Gartner estimates that by 2020 there will be over 26 billion devices connected to
the IoT. Jacob Morgan, A Simple Explanation of ‘The Internet of Things,’
FORBES (May 13, 2014, 12:05 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites
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information that society reasonably believes will remain private.139
To elaborate, the rise of cloud computing, social networking, and
market reliance on Big Data, begets a world where citizens cannot
reasonably expect that the majority of their digital data will remain
private.140
As Professor Ohm warns, we are headed toward a “world
without privacy.”141 In such a world, it would be futile for
individuals to expect that most of their personal information will
remain private. Thus, a Fourth Amendment built around reasonable
expectations of privacy will no longer be effective.
C. Impact of United States v. Carpenter on the REP Test
As mentioned above the, the Carpenter Court did not engage in
a two-step REP inquiry.142 Instead, the Chief Justice enumerated
three factors, aimed at the class of information sought, to
/jacobmorgan/2014/05/13/simple-explanation-internet-things-that-anyone-canunderstand/#2a401ae71d09 [https://perma.cc/LDY6-QFV7].
139
See id. Since consumers know that many household products from
refrigerators to toasters are now internet compatible, and often equipped with
voice or video monitoring capabilities, people have a lesser expectation of
privacy than in generations past.
140
See Ohm, supra note 122, at 1317–18. First, cloud computing, the
movement of computing and storage facilities to distant servers operated by
ECSPs, led to billions of users storing their communications and writings with
third-parties. Before the advent of could-based email services, like Gmail and
Hotmail, people used email accounts provided by their employers or ISPs.
Information on these accounts was saved periodically and locally. Now, billions
of users systematically store messages and writings on third-party servers.
Moreover, as discussed supra, user’s metadata can be accessed by law
enforcement with a mere court order—without a warrant or showing of probable
cause. Next, the rise of social networking platforms capitalize on people’s innate
desire to connect with others. Since people feel connection (and entertainment)
from using, and sharing personal information on these sites, the rise of social
networking provides electronic service providers with mass amounts of user data
that other types of ECSPs would never have access to. Finally, the widespread
use of data analytics to monetize user data by drawing inferences, known as
“Big Data,” diminishes any expectation of privacy users have over their personal
information. For example, companies can “re-identify” anonymized data by
applying an algorithm. Even if users take measures to ensure that their data is
anonymized, by removing any identifying markers, companies can restore the
identity of the data’s owner by analyzing patterns in the data. Id. at 1315–17.
141
See generally id.
142
See generally Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206.
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determine if the Fourth Amendment was invoked—marking a
notable shift away from a Fourth Amendment analysis focused
solely on privacy expectations.143 Notwithstanding well-settled
precedent that an individual lacks an objective expectation of
privacy in business records maintained by a third party, the Court
held that a search occurred when warrantless cell-site location
information (“CSLI”) records were obtained by the government.144
The Carpenter Court resolved whether a warrant is required for
law enforcement to retrieve historic145 CSLI, that is collected and
maintained by private companies for legitimate business
purposes.146 A cell-site is a cellular telephone “tower,” owned by a
wireless carrier, where radio signals are received from customer’s
cell phones.147 When a cell phone user makes a call, sends a text
message or email, accesses the internet, or in any way connects to
their cellular network, their cell-phone establishes a radio
connection with the closest cell-tower.148 Wireless service
providers create records (“CSLI records”) each time a cell-phone
connects to a specific tower.149 As a cell phone user moves, their
143

Id. at 2223.
Id. Probable cause is only required if CSLI records are collected for more
than six days. Id. at 2224 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
145
Historical location information refers to “[r]ecords stored by the wireless
service provider that detail the location of a cell phone in the past (i.e.: prior to
entry of the court order authorizing government acquisition).” Prospective
location information refers to “all cell site information that is generated after the
government has received court permission to acquire it.” You may also come
across the term “real time” location information. This is a subset of prospective
location information, and “refers to data used by the government to identify the
location of a phone at the present moment.” In re Application for Order of a Pen
Register, 402 F. Supp. 2d 597, 599 (D. Md. 2005).
146
See generally Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206.
147
Cell
Phone
Location
Tracking,
BERKELEY
L.,
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/2016-06-07_CellTracking-Primer_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YVE-R6NX] (last visited Jan. 30,
2019).
148
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2225 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
149
Id. Compare the information revealed in CSLI records at issue in Carpenter
(for a phone call, a wireless service provider records the date, time, and duration
of the call; the phone numbers making and receiving the call; the cell site
“pinged” when the call was made, and the specific connection that made the
connection, in its CSLI record) with the pen register used in Smith v. Maryland.
See 422 U.S. 735, 742 (1979).
144
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phone will send radio signals to multiple cell towers.150 The
location of these cell towers can be used to estimate the location of
an individual through triangulation.151
The circumstances giving rise to the Carpenter case arose after
police arrested four men suspected of a string of robberies of,
ironically, T-Mobile stores.152 One of the men confessed, and
provided police with the phone numbers of several accomplices.153
Based on this information, prosecutors applied for a § 2703(d)
Order to obtain cell-phone records for Carpenter and several
others.154 Two orders were granted directing Carpenter’s wireless
carrier, Sprint, to produce his cell-site location information
(“CSLI”) to law enforcement.155 Between the two orders, the
government obtained 12,898 location points cataloging the
defendant’s movements over 127 days.156 At trial, the prosecution
offered the CSLI records to show that the defendant was near four
of the robbery locations at the time they occurred.157 The
defendant’s motion to suppress the CSLI evidence was denied, and
he was convicted.158 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s
holdings.159 Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that law
enforcement may not collect historical CSLI for more than seven
days without a warrant.160 More importantly, it held that CSLI is
150

See BERKELEY L., supra note 147.
Id.
152
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212.
153
Id.
154
Pursuant to the SCA, law enforcement can require a wireless carrier to
disclose “a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer
of such service . . . when the government entity . . . offers specific and
articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the
contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other
information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal
investigation.” See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(c)–(d) (2010); supra Part I.A.3. Although
what constitutes “probable cause” is debated and fact specific, the reasonable
suspicion standard is significantly lower than the probable cause standard. See
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983).
155
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212.
156
Id.
157
Id. at 2212–13.
158
Id.
159
Id. at 2213.
160
Id. at 2217 n.3.
151
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protected “[w]hether the Government employs its own surveillance
technology . . . or leverages the technology of a wireless
carrier.”161
When assessing whether information was “searched,” the
Carpenter court shifted away from the Katz REP analysis, to a
multi-factor test.162 Justice Roberts set forth three factors, aimed at
the category of information sought by law enforcement.163 Lower
courts assessing whether a search of information held by a thirdparty occurred must now ask whether the category of information
(1) has a deeply revealing nature; (2) possesses depth, breadth, and
comprehensive reach; and (3) results from an inescapable and
automatic form of data collection.164
Notably, the Court’s focus on the type of information sought,
alone, marks a fundamental shift in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, which traditionally focuses on the actions taken by
law enforcement while obtaining such information.165 Under
Robert’s new test, a court determining whether a search occurred
will assess the “depth” and “breadth” of information held by a
third-party.166 Since there are no mandatory data retention
regulations governing ECSPs, it is up to the individual company to
decide how long to retain consumer data.167 Therefore, when
applied, the “depth” and “breadth” factor discussed by Roberts will
mandate that a district court delve into the decisions of private
businesses, specifically: how long the business keeps consumer

161

Id. at 2217.
See id. at 2223.
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984) (asserting that the
“reasonableness” requirement of the Fourth Amendment has been consistently
construed to regulate governmental action); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
353 (1967) (scrutinizing law enforcement’s actions to determine whether the
Fourth Amendment was violated).
166
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223.
167
See Ernesto Van der Sar, How Long Does Your ISP Store IP-Address
Logs?, TORRENT FREAK (June 29, 2012), https://torrentfreak.com/how-longdoes-your-isp-store-ip-address-logs-120629/ [https://perma.cc/KSJ5-26VL].
162
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data and how much data it keeps, in assessing whether a search
occurred.168
The next Subsection will discuss Carpenter’s determination
that CSLI is protected even when the government leverages the
technology of a wireless carrier, which is a marked departure from
the third-party doctrine. The third-party doctrine is grounded in the
REP approach.169
1. The Third-Party Doctrine
The third-party doctrine, as articulated in Smith and Miller,
states that an individual does not retain a reasonable expectation of
privacy in non-content information voluntarily conveyed to third
parties, such as telephone numbers or bank records.170 Thus, such
information does not receive Fourth Amendment protection. 171
The rationale underlying the third-party doctrine stems from two
common law rules: the “assumption of risk”172 doctrine and the
“voluntary exposure”173 doctrine.
First, the Supreme Court has held that when a person shares
secrets with another, they “assume the risk” of disclosure and lose
any Fourth Amendment protection over that information, “even if
the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used
only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third-

168
See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223. Companies must balance the potential
benefits of having access to old data, against the cost of storing data, and threats
of a breach, in formulating their data retention policies. See Ohm, supra note
131, at 31–32.
169
The Smith Court held, after “applying the Katz analysis,” that the defendant
did not possess a REP in metadata collected by a pen register since “people in
general [do not] entertain any actual expectation of privacy in the numbers they
dial.” 442 U.S. 735, 741–42 (1979) (holding “all telephone users realize that
they must ‘convey’ phone numbers to the telephone company, since it is through
telephone company switching equipment that their calls are completed.”).
170
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976); Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–
44.
171
Smith, 442 U.S. at 745–46.
172
Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 303 (1966).
173
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967); see also Dow Chem. Co.
v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 230 (1986) (articulating the “knowing exposure”
doctrine).
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party will not be betrayed.”174 Second, the Court held in Katz that
“[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection.”175
Based on the assumption of risk and voluntary exposure rules,
the Miller Court, applying the Katz test, reasoned that a person
cannot subjectively expect that what he knowing tells a third-party
will, in every case, remain secret.176 Miller also emphasized that no
objective privacy expectation exists to protect against the risk that
information related to another may be eventually given to the
government.177 This proposition has come to be known as the
third-party doctrine.178 Courts have categorically applied the thirdparty doctrine to circumstances where information shared online
with an ECSP is later accessed by the police.179
Although Carpenter’s precise impact on the third-party
doctrine is hotly debated, the Court rejected the longstanding view
that the doctrine categorically prohibited a Fourth Amendment
analysis whenever information is voluntarily conveyed to a third-

174
Miller, 425 U.S. at 443. See also United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745
(1971) (deciding electronic surveillance of voluntary conversations between
defendant and an informant does not constitute Fourth Amendment violation);
Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 293 (1966) (finding that defendant’s trust in an accomplice
does not create a legitimate expectation of privacy which would be infringed by
the accomplice’s delivery of incriminating information to the government).
175
Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (emphasis added).
176
Miller, 425 U.S. at 449.
177
Id. at 443 (“The depositor takes the risk that the financial information he
reveals to the bank may be relayed to the government.”).
178
See id. at 435; Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979).
179
See United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 511 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding that
individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy in CSLI); ACLU v.
Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 751 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding that the National
Security Agency’s mass metadata collection program did not violate the Fourth
Amendment because of the third-party doctrine); United States v. Graham, 846
F. Supp. 2d 384, 400 (D. Md. 2012) (holding that historical CSLI is not
protected by the Fourth Amendment because of the third-party doctrine); see
also Ohm, supra note 122, at 1327–28 (“A court could reasonably hold that
some of the content posted to Facebook has been knowingly exposed to the
public, and following conventional Fourth Amendment law, rule that it may be
obtained by the police without a warrant.”).
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party.180 After rejecting a bright-line rule, the Court implicitly
adopted petitioner’s argument that the third-party doctrine only
“diminishes the degree of privacy;” and set up a hierarchical
standard that focuses on the nature of the information sought; to
determine the proper, subsequent Fourth Amendment analysis.181
Put differently, individuals will retain a diminished privacy interest
in information that is more revealing, comprehensive, and
inescapably collected, than the information at issue in Smith and
Miller.182 Additionally, a third-party’s maintenance of such
information will not render it automatically outside of the Fourth
Amendment’s scope.183
Before assessing the private search doctrine, it is helpful to
discuss its intimate connection to the third-party doctrine.184 After
all, the private search doctrine stems from the same rationales and
implicates the same issues with ECSPs as the third-party
doctrine.185 Both the private search and third-party doctrines rely
on the idea that “[a] private search extinguishes an individual’s
reasonable expectation of privacy in the object searched . . . .”186 In
both circumstances, courts have held that once frustration of an
individual’s expectation of privacy occurs by a private actor, the

180

Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2210 (2018) (“[T]here is a
world of difference between the limited types of personal information addressed
in Smith and Miller and the exhaustive chronicle of location information
collected by wireless carriers.”); cf. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2478
(2014) (rejecting the formerly categorical application of the search incident to
arrest doctrine articulated in Robinson and holding that a cell-phone cannot be
searched incident to a lawful arrest).
181
Brief for Petitioner at 10, Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (No. 16-402).
182
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223.
183
See id. at 2217, 2223; Orin Kerr, Understanding the Supreme Court’s
Carpenter
Decision,
LAWFARE
(June
22,
2018,
1:18
PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/understanding-supreme-courts-carpenter-decision
[https://perma.cc/F5AU-JZUB].
184
See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217.
185
See id.
186
Priscilla Grantham Adams, Fourth Amendment Applicability: Private
Searches, U. MISS. SCH. L.: NAT’L CTR. FOR JUST. & RULE L. 1–2 (2008),
http://www.olemiss.edu/depts/ncjrl/pdf/PrivateSearchDoctrine.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BG38-TE6E].
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Fourth Amendments does not prohibit governmental use of the
now “non-private information.”187
Justice White, in his concurrence in Jacobsen, notes that the
private search doctrine “shares many of the doctrinal
underpinnings of cases establishing that ‘the Fourth Amendment
does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third
party and conveyed by him to Government authorities.’”188
Moreover, in first articulating the private search doctrine as we
conceptualize it today, Justice Stevens explained that the rule
“follows from the analysis applicable when private parties reveal
other kinds of private information to the authorities.”189 He
supports this assertion by noting that the Court repeatedly held that
the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit Government use of
information revealed by a third-party, even if that information was
revealed “on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited
purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be
betrayed.”190 Justice Stevens’ quote comes directly from Miller,
the case articulating the third-party doctrine.191
2. Private Search Doctrine
The Court addressed the implications of a private party
revealing information to law enforcement, outside of the context of
records held by a third-party, in United States v. Jacobsen.192 In
Jacobsen, two FedEx employees opened a damaged package
pursuant to a company policy regarding insurance claims.193 Upon
inspecting the package, the employees found a series of four zip
lock bags, the innermost containing six and a half ounces of white
powder.194 The employees notified law enforcement (“DEA”), and
placed the plastic bags back inside the package.195 When the DEA
187

United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984).
Id. at 130 (White, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Miller, 425 U.S.
435, 443 (1976)).
189
Id. at 117 (majority opinion).
190
Id. (quoting Miller, 425 U.S. at 443).
191
See id.
192
See generally id.
193
Id. at 111.
194
Id.
195
Id.
188

2019]

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT & HASH-VALUE MATCHING

1275

agent arrived, he opened the package from the end that had already
been visibly opened by the employees, opened each bag, and
removed a small amount of white substance to submit to a field test
for cocaine.196 Jacobsen challenged the DEA’s opening of the
package and testing of the powder as a warrantless search in
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.197 Expanding on its
recent decision in Walter, 198 the majority concluded that the DEA
agent had not conducted a “search,” because he had not exceeded
the scope of the previous private search when he opened the
package and removed the plastic bags.199 In explaining its
rationale, the Court explicitly based its conclusion on the
assumption of risk doctrine: when a party reveals private
information to another, he assumes the risk that his confidant will
reveal that information to the authorities, and if that occurs, the
Fourth Amendment does not prohibit governmental use of that
information.200 Moreover, the Court restated its holding in Miller,
that “the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of
information revealed to a third party and then conveyed by him to
Government authorities.”201
Today, Jacobsen stands for the proposition that a government
search that merely replicates a previous private search is not
subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny.202 A constitutional analysis
196

Id. at 111–12.
See infra Part I.C.4 (discussing the role of the binary search doctrine in
Jacobsen.).
198
The Supreme Court in Walter held that law enforcement’s warrantless
viewing of contraband video, voluntarily given to them a private party, who
viewed portions of the video, constituted a Fourth Amendment search. Since law
enforcement gained substantially more knowledge from viewing the video than
it had when it received the video from the private party, its actions expanded the
formerly private search and required probable cause. Walter v. United States,
447 U.S. 649 (1980).
199
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 116–20.
200
Id. at 117 (“This standard follows from the analysis applicable when private
parties reveal other kinds of private information to the authorities. It is well
settled that when an individual reveals private information to another, he
assumes the risk that his confidant will reveal that information to the authorities,
and if that occurs the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit governmental use of
that information.”).
201
Id. at 117 (quoting United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976)).
202
See generally id.
197
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is only triggered if the government search exceeds the scope of the
private search.203 Further, since the Constitution proscribes only
government action, the Court has held that regardless of whether
private action is reasonable or unreasonable, accidental or
deliberate, it does not violate the Fourth Amendment because of its
private nature.204
3. The Private Search Doctrine in Hashing Cases
All but one federal court205 ruled that law enforcement’s
acquisition and use of hash-evidence is not a Fourth Amendment
search, because an ECSP typically identifies the “matching”
images as contraband and submits them to NCMEC before law
enforcement views them: implicating the private search doctrine.206

203

See Walter, 447 U.S. at 657.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 115.
205
In 2008, the Middle District of Pennsylvania was the first court to address
the Fourth Amendment implications of warrantless hash-value matching in
United States v. Crist. Although the Crist court concluded that the “running of
hash values” is a search protected by the Fourth Amendment, the case is
inapplicable to this Note for two reasons. First, the private search that uncovered
child pornography on Crist’s computer was conducted by a human—not an
ECSP. Second, the Court swiftly held, without rationale, that by “subjecting [an]
entire computer to a hash value analysis –every file, internet history, picture, and
‘buddy list’ became available for government review [and] [s]uch examination
constitutes a search.” This proposition is inaccurate because it misconstrues
what hashing exposes to an observer. First, hash-values are predictors of data
that reveal no more about content than a random number. Thus, exposing a
hash-value to a government agent does not allow the agent to “review” the
underlying file, in the sense the Crist court indicated. See 627 F. Supp. 2d 575,
585 (M.D. Pa. 2008). The Court in United States v. Keith expressed this
proposition by holding that “matching the hash value of a file to a stored hash
value is not the virtual equivalent of viewing the contents of the file. What the
match says is that the two files are identical; it does not itself convey any
information about the contents of the file.” Second, unlike a label, a hash-value
has no inherent meaning. See 980 F. Supp. 2d 33, 43 (D. Mass. 2013). The
Miller Court, in regard to Google’s hashing policy, explained that a hash value
only acquires meaning “when it matches with a hash value in the child
pornography repository and therefore reminds Google that it has seen this image
before.” United States v. Miller, 2017 WL 2705963, at *5 (E.D. Ky. June 23,
2017). Lastly, the hashing process only works in one direction and a government
agent cannot “reverse” a hash-value back to the file it identified. See supra Part
I.A.
206
See infra Part I.A.3.
204
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Last year, the Fifth Circuit mechanically applied the private
search doctrine in denying a motion to suppress hash-evidence in
United States v. Reddick.207 In Reddick, a Microsoft user uploaded
a digital file to Microsoft Skydrive, a cloud hosting service.208
Skydrive employs a program called PhotoDNA, which discerns the
hash values of user uploaded files and compares them against the
hash values of known child pornography.209 Based on a hash value
match between defendant’s file, and a file known to contain child
pornography, Microsoft sent the file and defendant’s Internet
Protocol (“IP”) address to NCMEC’s CyberTipline.210 NCMEC
then sent its report (“CyberTip”) to the local police department
where the defendant lived.211 Upon receiving the CyperTip, a
detective opened each of the suspect files, confirmed they
contained child pornography, and applied for a warrant to search
defendant’s home.212 Defendant was arrested, and following his
indictment, he moved to suppress all evidence of child
pornography on the grounds that the detective’s warrantless
opening of the files associated with the CyperTip was an unlawful
search.213 The District Court denied defendant’s motion, holding
that although the detective’s viewing of the files invaded a
constitutional expectation of privacy, the evidence supported a
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.214 The Fifth Circuit
affirmed, but disagreed with the district court that the initial
viewing of the files violated the Fourth Amendment.215 The Circuit
Court reasoned that the present situation fell squarely within the
private search issue presented in Jacobsen—analogizing the
207

See generally United States v. Reddick, 900 F.3d 636 (5th Cir. 2018).
“Cloud server hosting is when hosting services are made available to
customers on demand via the Internet. Rather than being provided by a single
server or virtual server, cloud server hosting services are provided by multiple
connected servers that comprise a cloud.” Vangie Beal, Cloud Server Hosting,
WEBOPEDIA https://www.webopedia.com/TERM/C/cloud_server_hosting.html
[https://perma.cc/Z76R-6827] (last visited Jan. 31, 2019).
209
Reddick, 900 F.3d at 637–38.
210
Id.
211
Id.
212
Id.
213
Id.
214
Id.
215
See supra Part I.C.2 (discussing the private search doctrine).
208
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contents of the files defendant uploaded to a physical package. 216
The Court reasoned that when the defendant uploaded the files to
SkyDrive, Microsoft’s PhotoDNA program automatically reviewed
them and compared them against an existing database.217
Accordingly, Microsoft, a private actor “inspected and deemed
[defendant’s ‘package’] suspicious,” before its contents were
turned over to law enforcement, thereby frustrating any
expectation of privacy the Defendant had in his files.218
The analysis employed by the Reddick Court is consistent with
other courts addressing the private search issue arising from the
acquisition of hash-evidence.219 Since the private search doctrine
was so firmly rooted in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence before
Carpenter, courts faced with motions to suppress hash-evidence
only analyzed whether: (1) law enforcement’s activities exceeded
the scope of the ECSP’s private search; and (2) whether ECSP’s
are government “agents” for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment.220
The first issue, regarding the scope of the private search,
requires a fact-specific inquiry into the actions of law enforcement
upon receiving a NCMEC report. However, absent clear
government overreach, all courts have found that a detective’s
visual review of suspect images attached to a NCMEC report did
216

“The exact issues presented by this case may be novel. But the governing
constitutional principles set forth by the Supreme Court are not. The government
effectively learned nothing from Detective Ilse’s viewing of the files that it had
not already learned from the private search. Accordingly, under the private
search doctrine, the government did not violate Reddick’s Fourth Amendment
rights.” Reddick, 900 F.3d at 640.
217
Id. at 639.
218
Id.; see also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
219
See, e.g., United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292 (2016); United States
v. Miller, 2017 WL 2705963 (E.D. Ky. June 23, 2017).
220
Since this Note argues that the Court deviate from the REP based private
search doctrine, an analysis of the scope of a private search and government
agency are outside the purview of the current discussion. But see, e.g.,
Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292 (holding that law enforcement exceeded the scope of
AOL’s private search, when a detective opened four images attached to a
NCMEC report, and only one of the images had matched a hash-value of a
confirmed child pornographic image); Miller, 2017 WL 2705963 (holding that
Google is not a government agent when it voluntarily scans email attachments
for apparent child pornography).
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not exceed the scope of the initial private search, because the
detective knew with virtual certainty what the files contained.221
Further, no court has held that the PROTECT Act’s reporting
dynamic renders ECSP’s government actors for Fourth
Amendment purposes.222
4. The Binary Search Doctrine
Moreover, in addition to the barrier erected by the private
search doctrine, a defendant typically cannot suppress hashevidence because hash-value matching reveals information in the
“binary.”223 Put differently, hash-value matching indicates the
presence or absence of contraband, and nothing else.224
The constitutionality of a different type of binary search—a
field test for cocaine—was first raised in Jacobsen.225 There, the
Court held that the test did not constitute a search pursuant to the
binary search doctrine—articulated in dicta of United States v.
Place.226
In United States v. Place, the Supreme Court addressed the
Fourth Amendment’s relevance to surveillance techniques that
purportedly reveal only the presence or absence of contraband.227
In Place, the Court addressed whether the Fourth Amendment bars
221

See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 119 (employing “virtual certainty” test for
determining scope of private search); Reddick, 900 F.3d at 639 (holding that the
detective’s visual review of the files attached to a NCMEC report did not
“‘significant[ly] expan[d] the search that had been conducted previously by a
private party,’ sufficient to constitute ‘a separate search’”); Miller, 2017 WL
2705963, at *4 (holding that the detective did not exceed Google’s private
search since the detective had “near-certainty regarding what [he] would find
and little chance to see much other than contraband”).
222
See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 364 (4th Cir. 2010)
(holding that AOL was not a “mere conduit” for the government and was thus
not a government agent); Miller, 2017 WL 2705963, at *2 (holding “Google is
not a government actor”); cf. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602,
614 (1989) (providing the rule that in the context of the Fourth Amendment, if a
private individual conducts a search “as an instrument or agent of the
Government,” that search is subject to constitutional scrutiny).
223
See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
224
See supra Part I.A.1.
225
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109.
226
Id. at 123–24 (citing Place, 462 U.S. at 707).
227
Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
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law enforcement from temporarily detaining personal luggage for
exposure to a canine sniff on the basis of a reasonable suspicion.228
The majority concluded that Terry allowed the agents to briefly
detain the passenger’s luggage.229 In arriving at this conclusion, the
Court noted that the passenger’s luggage was seized to arrange its
exposure to a narcotics detection dog.230
Thus, the Court addressed, in dicta,231 whether the use of a
narcotics detection dog was a “search.”232 If so, the Court
reasoned, “the initial seizure of respondent’s luggage for the
purpose of subjecting it to the sniff test—no matter how brief—
could not be justified on less than probable cause.”233 The majority
answered this question in the negative, stating that “the canine
sniff is sui generis . . . no other investigative procedure [] is so
limited both in the manner in which the information is obtained
and in the content of the information revealed.”234 Specifically,
“[a] ‘canine sniff’ . . . does not expose noncontraband items that
otherwise would remain hidden from public view,” ensuring that
“the owner of the property is not subjected to the embarrassment
and inconvenience entailed in . . . more intrusive investigative
methods.”235 Additionally, the Court reasoned, “the sniff discloses
only the presence or absence of narcotics, which is a contraband
item. Thus, despite the fact that the sniff tells the authorities
something about the contents of the luggage, the information is
limited.”236
Although the Court’s categorization of a canine sniff as “sui
generis” was quickly contradicted, the reasoning articulated in
Place—that a minimally intrusive technique which only reveals the
228

Id. at 699.
Id. at 706.
230
Id.
231
Lower courts “are bound by the Supreme Court’s considered dicta almost as
firmly as by the Court’s outright holdings, particularly when . . . a dictum . . .
[is] not enfeebled by any subsequent statement.” McCoy v. Mass. Inst. of Tech.,
950 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1991).
232
Place, 426 U.S. at 706.
233
Id.; see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
234
Place, 426 U.S. at 707.
235
Id.
236
Id.
229
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presence or absence of a contraband item—was applied the
following year in Jacobsen.237
The Jacobsen Court considered whether a field test, used to
determine if a “suspicious white powder was cocaine . . . [and]
nothing more” violated an expectation of privacy that society
considered reasonable.238 Based on Place, the majority held that
“governmental conduct that can reveal whether a substance is
cocaine, and no other arguably ‘private’ fact, compromises no
legitimate privacy interest.”239 The Jacobsen majority contrasted a
societally recognized expectation of privacy, protected by the
Fourth Amendment, with a mere subjective belief that information
will be kept private.240 The Court interestingly employed the
example of “information voluntarily disclosed to a government[]
informant” as information over which a defendant may have an
actual expectation of privacy that is not objectively reasonable.241
Emphasizing the importance of the REP test’s objective prong, the
Court held that the narcotics field test did not constitute a search.242
Subsequent cases addressing surveillance techniques that
provide information in the binary have shifted away from the twofactor analysis employed by Place and Jacobsen, focusing solely
on the binary nature of the technique, and ignoring the level of
intrusiveness on the citizen.243 Scholars have labeled this approach
taken by courts as the “pure binary search doctrine.”244
The policy implications of the binary search doctrine have
faced considerable criticism, especially as surveillance technology

237
The year after Place was decided, the Supreme Court analyzed another
binary authentication method—a narcotics field test—under the Fourth
Amendment in United States v. Jacobsen. 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
238
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 122.
239
Id. at 123.
240
Id. at 122.
241
Id. at 123.
242
Id.
243
Compare United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983), and
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000), with Illinois v. Caballes, 543
U.S. 405, 408 (2005).
244
Laurent Sacharoff, The Binary Search Doctrine, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1139,
1145 (2014).
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becomes more precise.245 The Place line of cases implies that the
more tailored a surveillance technique is to detecting contraband,
the less Fourth Amendment protection the public will have over
what is being surveilled.246 This logic directly contradicts an
“equilibrium adjustment”247 theory of the Fourth Amendment, and
common sense. In criticizing the binary search doctrine, Aya
Gruber248 asserts that:
[i]f Caballes stands for the broad proposition that
there is no search when only contraband is detected,
then the government is free to deploy such
contraband detecting devices in each and every one
of our house on the ground that if we are innocent,
we have nothing to hide . . . all these devices could
be employed on the sole bases of police hunches,
whims, prejudices, or anything at all, because they
are beyond the purview of the Fourth
Amendment.249
Moreover, the binary search doctrine is inconsistent with
Fourth Amendment formalism—the prevailing school of thought
on Fourth Amendment theory.250
5. Formalist Approach to the Binary Search Doctrine
Analyzing the constitutionality of the binary search doctrine
requires a brief discussion of competing approaches to Fourth
Amendment rights: the formalist approach and the innocence

245

See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 135–38 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Salgado, supra
note 8.
246
Marcia Hofmann, Arguing for Suppression of ‘Hash’ Evidence, CHAMPION,
May 2009, at 20, 23.
247
See infra Part I.A.
248
Aya Gruber is a Professor of Law at the University of Colorado Law School
and Scholar in the fields of gender and race law. Aya Gruber, COLO. L.,
https://lawweb.colorado.edu/profiles/profile.jsp?id=325
[https://perma.cc/5QFV-RZS3] (last visited Jan. 31, 2019).
249
Aya Gruber, Garbage Pails and Puppy Dog Tails: Is That What Katz Is
Made Of?, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 781, 823–24 (2008).
250
See generally Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018); United
States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27
(2001).
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approach.251 This Subsection reviews the competing approaches, in
favor of the formalist view.
Formalism, the majority approach, focuses solely on the
quantum of evidence gathered by the state before conducting a
search, and declines to identify or articulate any continuum of
privacy entitlement turning on individual conduct.252 Formalism
views the key feature of the amendment as the duties it places on
government actors.253 Thus, an individual’s behavior—their guilt
or innocence—is irrelevant in analyzing the scope of their
constitutional protection.254 Under the formalist view, any
violation of the Fourth Amendment constitutes cognizable harm,
even if the subject of the search is factually guilty.255
Although formalism is the prevailing approach to the Fourth
Amendment, the Supreme Court recognizes co-existing theories,
allowing it to choose which theory to apply based on the specific
facts of a given case.256 The binary search cases represent an
innocence model of Fourth Amendment theory,257 which implies
that harm only occurs when an innocent person is illegally
searched.258 Such a model confers a greater privacy entitlement to
the innocent than the guilty.259 The innocence model views the
251
See Sherry F. Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and Targeting in Fourth
Amendment Jurisprudence, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1456, 1462–63 (1996).
252
Id. at 1466–67.
253
Id.
254
Id. at 1467.
255
Id. “The set of parties injured by unreasonable searches thus consists of all
persons searched without the appropriate level of pre-search knowledge on the
part of the relevant public official. Accordingly, when the public official has the
requisite prior knowledge, there is no violation of the right of privacy and no
constitutional harm.” Id.
256
Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 503, 507 (2007).
257
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984) (“It is probably safe to
assume that virtually all of the tests conducted under circumstances comparable
to those disclosed by this record would result in a positive finding; in such
cases, no legitimate interest has been compromised.” (emphasis added)).
258
See id. at 137.
259
C.f. id. (The binary search doctrine can only be supported by an innocence
theory of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that assumes that the Fourth
Amendment protects only the innocent.) In articulating the doctrine, the
Jacobsen Court held that “Congress has decided-and there is no question about
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Fourth Amendment as an “imperfect divining rod,” aimed at
maximizing the number of “ideal” searches—those that reveal
evidence of a crime.260 Arnold Loewy, a proponent of the
innocence model, describes a hypothetical “divining rod” to
demonstrate the goal of the Fourth Amendment under the
innocence model:
In a Utopian society, each policeman would be
equipped with an evidence-detecting divining rod.
He would walk up and down the streets and
whenever the divining rod detected evidence of
crime, it would locate the evidence. First, it would
single out the house, then it would point to the
room, then the drawer, and finally the evidence
itself. Thus, all evidence of crime would be
uncovered in the most efficient possible manner,
and no innocent person would be subject to a
search. In a real society (such as ours), the fourth
amendment serves as an imperfect divining rod.261
Loewy’s divining rod, which he hypothesized in 1983, posits a
perfectly efficient binary search.262 In the context of child
pornography prosecutions, Loewy’s divining rod exists—hashvalue matching.263 The propriety of Loewy’s approach boils down
to which harms one believes the Fourth Amendment is intended to
prevent. This Note agrees with the formalist view that society has a
collective right to government compliance with the Fourth
Amendment, therefore, a violation of the right constitutes harm
even when it reveals evidence of criminal wrongdoing.

its power to do so-to treat the interest in ‘privately’ possessing cocaine as
illegitimate; thus governmental conduct that can reveal whether a substance is
cocaine, and no other arguably ‘private’ fact, compromises no legitimate privacy
interest.” Id. at 123. Thus, the Court based its articulation of the doctrine on the
proposition that there is no Forth Amendment protection over illicit activity; an
innocence theory of the amendment.
260
See generally Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for
Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229 (1983).
261
Id. at 1244.
262
See id.
263
See supra Part I.A.1.
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The Court’s endorsement of a formalist approach to the Fourth
Amendment is illustrated by its focus on state action when
reviewing a motion to suppress evidence.Whether a defendant can
utilize his Fourth Amendment rights (and move to exclude
evidence against him) depends on the actions of a third-party.
Specifically, this inquiry focuses on whether the state has
established probable cause.264 The Court’s focus on state action is
further exemplified by judicially recognized exceptions,
“excusing” officers from the probable cause requirement on the
premise that their behavior was justified by, among other reasons,
fear for their own, or public safety.265 The result of this statefocused analysis is that an individual retains a privacy right until
the state acquires enough knowledge of criminal activity to invade
that right.266
The paradox of defining an individual right by the conduct of
someone aside from the right holder can be rationalized by viewing
an analog, collective right to the Fourth Amendment procedure
itself, implicating different policy concerns than those implicated
when one’s substantive right is violated.267 Thus, in an important
sense, the right conferred by the amendment is that the government
complies with its probable cause and reasonableness
requirements.268 If a collective right is recognized to safeguard
procedure, all of society is harmed when that procedure is not
complied with.269
A proponent of the innocence approach may counter the above
assertion by correctly noting that the boundaries of a Fourth
Amendment right holder’s protection are partially determined by
264

See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Loewy, supra note 260 at 1240.
See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (articulating the public
safety exception to the warrant requirement); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 3
(1968) (establishing that if a police officer has a reasonable suspicion that a
suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime and has a
reasonable belief that the person “may be armed and presently dangerous,” the
officer can briefly seize and search the suspect without a warrant).
266
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
267
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides a substantive
right to be free from unreasonable government scrutiny. See id.
268
See id.
269
See id.
265
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their own actions. For example, an individual can forfeit their right
in multiple ways, such as indicating the lack of an expectation of
privacy or creating circumstances that are objectively dangerous to
law enforcement or society.270 However, if an analog collective
right to procedural integrity is recognized, an unreasonable search
that uncovers evidence of a crime is still unconstitutional.271 In
such a scenario, an individual may have forfeited her substantive
right to be free of unreasonable government scrutiny, but, the state
still violated society’s collective right securing procedural
indignity by invading a target’s privacy without a sufficient
evidentiary foundation.272
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT EXCEPTIONALISM
“The Constitution is premised on an ordinary rate
of change in the balance of power between the state
and the people. The Fourth Amendment is our
national thermostat, recalibrating what the police
can and cannot do.”273
In an era of unprecedented technological innovation, the Court
must grapple with when and how to adjust the scope of the Fourth
Amendment to maintain its core protections. Regarding the when,
this Note argues that if a new technology is “exceptional,” the law
must inevitably adjust its approach to assessing disputes arising
from that technology. An exceptional technology is one that
disrupts the balance of power maintained by the Fourth
Amendment.274 Regarding the how, this Note proposes that Courts
should decline to apply traditional, “mono-analogical”275 reasoning

270

See, e.g., Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 323 (1987) (establishing that
leaving evidence in plain view forfeits privacy right); Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (holding that knowing exposure of information to a
third-party forfeits one’s Fourth Amendment protection).
271
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
272
See id.
273
Ohm, supra note 131, at 59.
274
See infra Part I.A.1.
275
“The term ‘mono-analogical’ designates a brand of analogical reasoning
where only a single dimension of a subject is mapped.” Luke M. Milligan,
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in assessing whether a novel technology is subject to a pre-existing
legal doctrine.276 Mono-analogical reasoning refers to a type of
analogical reasoning where only a single dimension of a subject is
mapped—typically, the subject’s function.277 This Note argues that
a multi-dimensional, “poly-analogical” approach should be
employed when assessing the fit of an exceptional technology
within pre-existing doctrine. When digital information is searched,
the dimensions assessed should track the three factors delineated
by Roberts in Carpenter: (1) “the deeply revealing nature” of the
information revealed, (2) the information’s “depth, breath, and
comprehensive reach,” and (3) “the inescapable and automatic
nature of [the information’s] collection.”278 The Carpenter factors
look beyond the function of the technology employed, to the nature
of the information revealed by the surveillance.279
Part II first explores the inherently unstable nature of the
Fourth Amendment. Next, it discusses what makes a technology
“exceptional,” requiring the Court to deviate from conventional,
mono-analogical reasoning. This Part proposes that a technology is
exceptional if it throws off the existing balance of Fourth
Amendment power. Further, it proposes a cost-focused, “structural
privacy rights” approach to determining if the existing balance has
been disrupted. In short, this approach posits that if a new
technology costs significantly less for the government to employ, it
will likely eviscerate an implicit, non-legal right, which disrupts
the constitutional balance. Further, this Part explains the flaws of
mono-analogical legal reasoning, and why it cannot account for
exceptional technologies. Finally, it analyzes how the Supreme
Court’s decisions in Riley and Carpenter considered technological
exceptionalism in applying a comprehensive, poly-analogical
analysis to fundamentally change Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.

Analogy Breakers: A Reality Check on Emerging Technologies, 80 MISS. L.J.
1319, 1320 (2011).
276
See supra Part I.C.
277
Milligan, supra note 275, at 1323–24.
278
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018).
279
See id.
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A. A Dynamic Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures.”280 The Supreme Court has
recognized that the “basic purpose” of the Fourth Amendment “is
to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against
arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.”281 In theory, the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, mandating that an
officer must acquire a warrant, founded on “probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized,” acts
as this critical safeguard.282
But, in reality, a warrantless government search or seizure can
still comply with the Fourth Amendment if it falls into one of the
many exceptions to the warrant requirement.283 The label
“exception” is a misnomer in this context, as warrantless searches
occur more often than searches conducted pursuant to a warrant.284
Absent more precise guidance from the founding era, the Court
generally determines whether to exempt a given type of search
from the warrant requirement “by assessing, on one hand, the
degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on
the other hand, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion
of legitimate governmental interests.”285
The Court’s ad hoc approach to invoking the warrant
requirement has thus forged hundreds of seemingly unrelated
rules—frustrating scholars, judges, and citizens alike.286 In
280

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
282
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
283
See generally Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (2011) (explaining that the
warrant requirement is subject to reasonable exceptions).
284
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014).
285
Id. at 2484.
286
In a 2009 interview, Justice Scalia discussed his hatred of Fourth
Amendment cases, complaining that every case is so fact specific that a
particular opinion merely answers “variation 3,542.” Interview by Susan Swain
with Antonin Scalia, Assoc. Justice, United States Supreme Court, in Wash.
D.C. (June 19, 2009), https://www.c-span.org/video/?286079-1/supreme-courtjustice-scalia [https://perma.cc/V7QW-9FZS]; see also Samuel C. Rickless, The
281
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response to the ostensibly jumbled mess of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, Professor Orin Kerr posits that the amendment’s
interpretation must constantly change with advancing technologies
and social norms.287 Professor Kerr reasons that the balance of
power struck by the amendment, in any given technological and
social era, is inherently unstable.288 Thus, the amendment is
constantly adjusting its scope.289 When changing technology or
social norms expand government power, the Supreme Court
tightens Fourth Amendment protection; and when they threaten
government power, the Court loosens constitutional protections.290
Since technology alters how citizens commit crimes and how
police catch them, new technologies threaten the balance between
individual privacy and effective law enforcement by enabling both
police and citizens to accomplish tasks they could not previously
accomplish.291 Judges must respond to such changes to restore the
preexisting level of police power, an approach Kerr calls
“equilibrium adjustment.”292
The Supreme Court’s approach to the infrared thermal imaging
device at issue in Kyllo v. United States exemplifies Kerr’s
theory.293 In Kyllo, police suspected that the defendant was
growing marijuana inside his home using high intensity lamps.294
Subsequently, police used a thermal imaging device, set up on a
public street, to show that part of the defendant’s home was
unusually hot.295 Police used this information to secure a warrant
Coherence of Orthodox Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 15 GEO. MASON U.
C.R.L.J. 261, 261 (2005) (“If there is any statement to which virtually all
constitutional scholars would agree, it is that orthodox Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence is a theoretical mess, full of doctrinal incoherence and
inconsistency, revealing not much more than the constitutionally unmoored
ideological predispositions of shifting majorities of Supreme Court justices.”).
287
Kerr, supra note 111, at 480.
288
Id. at 487.
289
See id. at 480.
290
Id. at 482.
291
See generally id.
292
Id. at 480; see also Ohm, supra note 122, at 1312 (“I embrace [equilibrium
adjustment] theory as not only a convincing description of what courts have
done but also a normatively desirable theory of what courts should do.”).
293
533 U.S. 27 (2001).
294
Id. at 27.
295
Id. at 29–30.
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to search the defendant’s home, resulting in criminal charges
against the defendant and a Fourth Amendment challenge to the
police’s warrantless use of the thermal imaging device.296 Writing
for the majority, Justice Scalia framed the inquiry at issue as: what
limits must the Court place on the power of technology to avoid
the evisceration of individual liberties?297 Ultimately, the Court
held that using sense enhancing technology to obtain information
about the interior of the home “that could not otherwise have been
obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally
protected area’ constitutes a search.”298 Notably, the Court
reasoned that its holding “assures preservation of the degree of
privacy against government that existed when the Fourth
Amendment was adopted.”299 The Kyllo Court recognized that the
police had gained an unfair advantage in determining facts due to
technological innovation, and subsequently fashioned its ruling to
address this imbalance and tighten Fourth Amendment
safeguards.300
However, Kerr’s equilibrium adjustment theory does not
discuss the types of novel technologies that disturb the
constitutional balance.301 The following sub-part discusses the kind
of technological change that disrupts the Fourth Amendment
equilibrium, requiring a departure from conventional legal
analysis. This Note adopts Professor Ohm’s label and refers to
such technologies as “exceptional.”
1. Technological Exceptionalism
The idea of exceptionalism is that “a person, place, object, or
concept is qualitatively different from others in the same basic

296

Id.
See id. at 33–34 (“It would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy
secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by
the advance in technology. . . . The question we confront today is what limits
there are upon this power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed
privacy.”).
298
Id. at 34.
299
Id.
300
See generally id.
301
See generally Kerr, supra note 111.
297
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category.”302 If something is “exceptional,” it differs in meaningful
respects from others of its kind.303 It follows that the law should
depart from conventional analysis when assessing disputes arising
from the exceptional thing.304 In departing from conventional
analysis, the law should decline to analogize an exceptional thing
to other “non-exceptional” things of its kind.305
For instance, disputes at sea are treated as exceptional. Since
there is no sovereign of the open sea, the laws of tort, property, and
contract provide distinct rules to resolve maritime disputes.306
Moreover, many scholars propose that the internet, like maritime
law, constitutes a separate sovereign that no contemporary legal
system can adequately govern.307 Thus, they argue that cyberspace
should be treated differently, and that the law should engage in a
standalone analysis when disputes arise.308
Ryan Calo synthesizes this viewpoint in arguing that the field
of Cyberlaw is premised on the idea that fundamental advances in
technology—such as the internet—are so qualitatively and
quantitatively different from what has come before, that they force
the law to treat them differently.309 Calo defines a technology as
exceptional, and thus requiring a standalone legal analysis, “when
its introduction into the mainstream requires a systematic change
to the law or legal institutions in order to reproduce, or if necessary
displace, an existing balance of values.”310
At first glance, Calo’s definition seems circular, as it states: (1)
if a technology is exceptional, it requires different treatment from
the law; and (2) a technology will be deemed exceptional if it

302

Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513,
550 (2015).
303
Id. at 551.
304
See id.
305
See id. at 550.
306
Id. at 551.
307
Id.
308
But see Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse,
1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207–08 (arguing against internet exceptionalism by
likening studying Internet law to studying “the law of the horse”).
309
Calo, supra note 302, at 552.
310
Id.
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requires the law to treat it differently.311 However, Calo’s focus is
pointed toward the technology’s impact on an existing balance of
values—suggestive of Kerr’s equilibrium adjustment theory.312 In
the Fourth Amendment context, this Note extrapolates Calo’s
definition to state that a technology is exceptional if its function
and other attributes meaningfully disturb the existing balance of
values between effective law enforcement and individual
privacy.313 If a technology is shown to disrupt the existing balance
of Fourth Amendment values, it is exceptional, and should not be
conventionally analogized to other technologies of its kind.314
2. Quantifying What Renders a Technology “Exceptional”
But, how do we quantify a disruption to the balance of Fourth
Amendment values? Paul Ohm, in endorsing and expanding Kerr’s
equilibrium adjustment theory, asserts that introducing “statistical
quantities,” such as an empirical study showing the relative costs
of police surveillance techniques,315 could evidence that a
particular surveillance technique disturbed the constitutional
balance.316 Ohm ratifies Bankston & Soltani’s317 focus on the
relative costs of surveillance techniques as an acceptable metric to
determine if the technique caused a constitutional imbalance.318
This Note explores Bankston & Soltani’s cost-focused,
structural privacy rights approach to determine if a new technology
disrupts the Fourth Amendment. The cost-centric, structural
privacy rights model is one way to lend rigor to the equilibrium
311

See id. at 552–53.
See Kerr, supra note 111, at 478.
313
See infra Part I.A.3.
314
See Calo, supra note 302, at 552–53.
315
Kevin S. Bankston & Ashkan Soltani, Tiny Constables and the Cost of
Surveillance: Making Cents Out of United States v. Jones, 123 YALE L.J.
ONLINE 335, 337–38 (2014).
316
Ohm, supra note 122, at 1313.
317
Askhan Soltani is an independent researcher and technologist specializing
in privacy, security and behavioral economics. Bankston & Soltani, supra note
315, at 357. Kevin Bankston is an activist and attorney who specializes in the
areas of free speech and privacy law. Kevin Bankston, NEW AM.,
https://www.newamerica.org/our-people/kevin-bankston/
[https://perma.cc/UJ6S-Y4VP] (last visited Jan. 31, 2019).
318
See Ohm, supra note 131, at 22.
312
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adjustment theory, by analyzing the consequences of a relaxation
of financial constraints on law enforcement. It is not the only
metric that can concretize if, and the extent to which, the Fourth
Amendment balance has been disrupted.
3. Cost-Centric Structural-Privacy Rights Approach to
“Exceptionalism”
Bankston & Soltani theorize that a Fourth Amendment search
has occurred if a new technology makes it “much less expensive”
to gather information than previous technologies.319 This
proposition is underscored by Harry Surden’s theory of “structural
privacy rights,” defined as: non-legal, implied regulations on
government conduct that society has come to expect will not be
infringed, due to physical and technological barriers preventing
government acquisition of the information sought to remain
private.320 As technology advances, technological barriers,
specifically the high costs of engaging in long-term,
comprehensive surveillance, erode, allowing government access to
information formerly expected to remain private.321 As these
barriers erode, individuals swiftly and permanently lose the
underlying structural privacy right they once protected.322 Surden
calls the diminution in “structural” privacy rights after the advent
of a new technology, a “rights-shift.”323
Further, structural privacy rights, are akin to “negative legal
rights”324 that emanate from structural privacy constraints.325

319

See Bankston & Soltani, supra note 315, at 337.
See Harry Surden, Structural Rights in Privacy, 60 SMU L. REV. 1605,
1608–09 (2007).
321
Id.
322
See id.
323
See id. at 1618; Bankston & Soltani, supra note 315, at 339–41. Surden
employs the term “rights-shift” to describe technology’s erosion of a structural
right resulting in a gap in the regulatory scheme constraining infringements on
societally recognized expectations of privacy. See Surden, supra note 320, at
1618–19.
324
Wesley Hohfeld defined individual legal rights in terms of how others are
required to behave in relation to the rights holder. Moreover, he famously
suggested that a “negative legal right” is created when others have a legal duty
to refrain from behaviors that interfere with the rights holder. Joseph William
320
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Moreover, advances in technology diminish a structural right
indirectly, by removing a structural constraint.326 Structural
privacy constraints, a type of “non-legal regulatory device,”327
arise from the practical short-comings of the current technological
and physical state of the world.328 Due to physical and
technological limits, some information gathering activities will be
so costly in resources and time, that they are effectively impossible
to regularly execute.329 The presence of these costs implicitly
curtail the behavior of law enforcement seeking such private
information—by acting as a structural constraint on police
behavior.330 In turn, society comes to expect that law enforcement
will not engage in certain behaviors; conferring on them an
expectation based, “negative structural right.”331
Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to
Hohfeld, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 975, 986–87.
325
A structural privacy constraint can be seen to confer the structural privacy
right. There is a parallel between a non-legal constraint mechanism, caused by
practical limitations, and a legal right, created by judge or legislature, in that
they both provide citizens with the same protection. In support of this
proposition, Harry Surden, Fellow at the Stanford Center for Computers and the
Law, posits that legal rights are created when others have a legal duty to refrain
from behavior that interferes with the rights-holder. It follows from this
definition that such a right would limit interference with a right-holder’s
protection. The same outcome, limited interference with a rights-holder’
protection, is achieved through non-legal constraint mechanisms. Surden further
emphasizes that non-legal constraint mechanisms may give rise to relationships
between constraints and behaviors that are functionally equivalent to the
relationships giving rise to legal rights. See Surden, supra note 320, at 1610–20.
326
Id.
327
“Non-legal regulatory devices” are also known as “alternative behavior
regulators.” Id. at 1610.
328
There are two types of structural constraints—explicit and latent. Latent
structural constraints—which are more applicable to regulating private
information—are the secondary costs arising from the current technological or
physical state of the world. Put differently, the limitations of technology make
some behaviors too timely or expensive to be conducted on a regular basis. Id. at
1613. By contrast, an explicit structural constraint is an overt constraint on a
behavior. The paradigm example of an explicit structural constraint is a physical
fence surrounding a property. In that scenario, a certain behavior—entering the
property—is constrained by the physical cost incurred by climbing over the
fence. Id. at 1612.
329
See generally id.
330
See id. at 1614.
331
Id.
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For example, in Kyllo, the Court recognized that sense
enhancing technology disrupted the status quo between police and
citizens, because it gave police “x-ray vision” inside a suspect’s
home, which was unavailable before the advent of thermal imaging
technology.332 Thus, the “negative structural right” to be free from
long-distance surveillance of the interior of one’s home was eroded
by the advent of thermal imaging, thereby disrupting the Fourth
Amendment balance.
Structural privacy protections are especially important in the
field of privacy law.333 Justice Alito remarked in his concurrence
in Jones, that before the advent of the computer, “the greatest
protections of privacy were neither constitutional nor statutory, but
practical.”334 Scholars thus assert that as structural privacy rights
erode in the face of new technology, individual privacy protections
are greatly diminished.335 Moreover, the implicit nature of a
structural right renders it of little interest to policy makers: “[i]n
other words, as long as some mechanism is acceptably constraining
unwanted behavior, the underlying issue and the choice of
mechanism will garner little attention.”336 Since it is easy for
policy makers to overlook “rights-like” relationships that are not
expressed by law, legislators focus little energy on codifying
structural rights into legal ones.337 Thus, a structural right will
rarely, if ever, be accompanied by a legal right conferring the same
protection.338 Therefore, when a structural right dissolves, society
is left with no regulation of the formerly curtailed behavior;
resulting in a sharp shift in the regulatory framework.339 Harry
Surden terms this phenomenon a “rights-shift.”340

332

Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 418–31 (2012) (Alito, J.,
concurring).
334
See id. at 429.
335
See Surden, supra note 320, at 1617; Ohm, supra note 131, at 59.
336
Surden, supra note 320, at 1614.
337
See id.
338
See id.
339
Once a particular constraint mechanism is successfully “employed”—such
as a structural privacy constraint—policymakers may be unaware or indifferent
to the details of the regulatory mechanism as long as it reasonably constrains
unwanted behavior. See id. “In other words, as long as some mechanism is
333
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Justice Alito’s concurrence in Jones serves as a helpful
example of the Court’s recognition of the swift disappearance of a
structural privacy right—the right to be free of comprehensive,
long term location tracking.341 The Court explicitly noted that
“society’s expectation has been that law enforcement agents and
others would not—and indeed simply could not—secretly monitor
and catalogue every single movement of an individual’s car for a
very long period.”342
4. Cost Centric Approach to Eroding Privacy Rights
In his concurrence in Jones, Justice Alito adopts a cost-centric
approach to the disappearance of the structural right at issue.343
First, he discusses the financial constraints that rendered
“traditional surveillance for any extended period of time []
difficult[,] costly, and [] rarely undertaken.”344 Alito explains that
comprehensively monitoring an individual over an extended period
of time, “would have required a large team of agents, multiple
vehicles, and perhaps aerial assistance,” a costly undertaking that
would have only been justified for an unusually important
investigation.345 Alito jokes that such comprehensive monitoring
would not have been impossible in the Framer’s era absent “a very
tiny constable . . . with incredible fortitude and patience” to hide
for twenty-eight days.346 After noting that devices like GPS
surveillance “make long-term monitoring relatively easy and
cheap,”347 removing the structural constraint on comprehensive,
long-term monitoring, Alito recognizes the need for a legal
constraint to restore constitutional balance. Thus, Alito maintains
acceptably constraining unwanted behavior, the underlying issue and the choice
of mechanism will garner little [legal] attention.” Id.
340
Id. at 1618.
341
See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
342
Id.
343
See id. at 429.
344
Id.
345
Id.
346
Id. at 420 n.3.
347
Id. at 430. After Jones, Bankston & Soltani determined that GPS
surveillance costs twenty-eight times less than tracking an individual via covert
car pursuit, and tracking via CSL costs half as much as GPS surveillance. See
Bankston & Soltani, supra note 315, at 350.
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that even if the government had not physically trespassed on the
defendant’s car, Jones had a reasonable expectation of privacy over
the totality of his movements; based on a long-held expectation
that law enforcement would not, and could not, access such
information.348 Here, Alito has recognized a rights-shift disrupting
the Fourth Amendment equilibrium, caused by the advent of
GPS.349 Under the framework proposed by this Note, Alito
implicitly deemed GPS technology “exceptional.”
Bankston & Soltani add a quantitative metric to lend rigor to
Alito’s “structural rights-shift” theory of GPS technology, at issue
in Jones.350 To do so, they conducted an empirical study, assessing
the relative expense to law enforcement of employing: foot pursuit,
covert pursuit, single car pursuit, five car pursuit, beeper
technology, cell-phone tracking using a sting ray, GPS tracking,
and tracking via CSLI.351 After comparing the relative costs of
these techniques, they assert a general rule of thumb: if a new
technology makes it “much less expensive” to collect information
about individuals, a rights-shift has occurred.352 This paradigm
proposes a cost-centric approach to determining technological
exceptionalism.353 If a technology makes surveillance “much less
expensive;” a rights-shift will ensue; tipping the Fourth
Amendment balance in favor of law enforcement; which, under the
definition proposed by this Note, renders the technology
exceptional.354
To continue, Ryan Calo and Paul Ohm propose that if a
technology is exceptional, it should receive a “fresh default
analysis” or “standalone.”355 Since many new technological
advances cause a rights-shift, throwing off the balance of power
struck by the Fourth Amendment, this Note argues that courts will
be wary to employ a fresh-default analysis each time an

348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355

See Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring).
See Surden, supra note 320, at 1626.
Bankston & Soltani, supra note 315, at 337.
See id at 342.
Id. at 337.
See id.
Id.; Ohm, supra note 131.
Ohm, supra note 131, at 47; see Calo, supra note 302, at 551.
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exceptional technology is at issue. Instead, this Note endorses a
holistic analysis of the technology and its implications, geared
toward the class of information sought. This approach does not
automatically reject well-settled Fourth Amendment doctrine, but
allows for a departure from categorical rules in certain
circumstances. The following sub-part discusses this holistic
analysis, labeled by Professor Luke Milligan as “poly-analogical”
reasoning.
B. Rejecting Conventional Analogies When an Exceptional
Technology Is at Issue
Analogical reasoning is often thought to be at the core of legal
reasoning, and thus, judicial decision making.356 An “analogy” is
defined as “the inference that two or more things that are similar to
each other in some respects are also similar in other respects.”357
1. Mono-Analogical Reasoning
The prevailing approach courts use to analogize a novel fact
pattern to a pre-existing one is described by Professor Milligan as
mono-analogical.358 The term mono-analogical describes a type of
analogical reasoning where only one dimension of a tool or
technology is assessed.359 When technology is analyzed, most
often, the technology’s function is assessed by comparing it to the
function of a previous technology.360 Mono-analogical reasoning
typically works in “four simple steps:”
(1) Fact pattern A has a certain characteristic, X; (2) Fact
pattern B differs from A in some respects, but shares characteristic,
X; (3) the law treats characteristic X in a certain way; (4) because
B shares a characteristic (X) with A, the law should treat B the
same way it treats A.361
356
See Grant Lamond, Precedent and Analogy in Legal Reasoning, in
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2016);
Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 15 U. CHI. L. REV. 501,
504 (1948).
357
Analogy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1995).
358
Milligan, supra note 275, at 1319–20.
359
Id. at 1323–24.
360
See id. at 1322.
361
Id. at 1321–22.
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Mono-analogical reasoning can be very useful when used to
liken two non-exceptional items, regardless of any facial
similarities between them.362 For example, the facts of the famous
tort case MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., in which a car
manufacturer was held liable for damages suffered by a third-party,
can be analogized to a situation where a plaintiff finds a dead snail
at the bottom of her soft drink; based on only one element of each
factual scenario.363 A soda bottle and a car are quite different.
However, the legal nexus between the two—the fact that negligent
production of either can be expected to produce “danger”—is
strong enough to determine that both scenarios allow a plaintiff to
directly sue a manufacturer.364 Here, the Court only needed to
focus on one dimension of each fact pattern to reach its conclusion:
if a soda bottle or a car are negligently manufactured, injury to a
third-party, not in contract with the manufacturer, may result.365
The mono-analogical reasoning employed here may look as
follows:
(1) A negligently manufactured vehicle can be
expected to produce “danger” to its user; (2) A
negligently produced soda bottle (for example, one
with a snail inside) may also produce danger to its
user; (3) the law will hold a manufacturer liable to
an injured user if a vehicle malfunctions due to its
manufacturer’s negligence; (4) because a user may
be injured by a snail negligently allowed in a soda
bottle, the law will hold the manufacturer liable if
the user is injured.366

362

Frederick Schauer & Barbara A. Spellman, Analogy, Expertise, and
Experience, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 249, 262 (2017).
363
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1055 (N.Y. 1916);
Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] AC 562 (HL) 562.
364
See Schauer & Spellman, supra note 362, at 263–64.
365
Id.
366
Cf. id. (this type of mono-analogical reasoning looks only at the product’s
propensity, if negligently manufactured, to cause injury to a user not in contract
with the product’s manufacturer. Thus, although there are many facial
differences between a tortuously manufactured car and soda bottle, courts often
reach conclusions based a single similarity between otherwise dissimilar cases.)
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In this instance, the dimensions that differentiate a car and soda
bottle manufacturer, such as the tools used for manufacturing,
customers reached, efficiency of the operation, and so on, do not
affect the relevant legal analysis. The Court reached its
conclusions, focusing on just one aspect of the manufacturers: does
their product, if produced negligently, have the potential to cause
danger to a user?367
By contrast, mono-analogical reasoning is under-inclusive
when an exceptional technology is analyzed to a non-exceptional
one. A famous example of the Court attempting to draw such an
analogy occurred in Olmstead v. United States.368 In Olmstead,
FBI agents installed wiretaps in the basement of the defendant’s
office building and in the streets near his home due to suspicion
that he was illegally transporting liquor.369 The Court addressed
whether the wiretaps constituted a warrantless “search” of the
defendant’s conversations, despite the lack of government trespass.
Finding that no search occurred, the Court analyzed as follows:
(1) Numerous cases before the Court involved fact
patterns without physical trespass; (2) the Court had
never found a Fourth Amendment search without
physical trespass; (3) the FBI’s use of a wiretap did
not involve physical trespass; (4) the use of a
wiretap does not constitute a Fourth Amendment
search.370
Olmstead, which was overturned by United States v. Katz in
1967, is a prime example of the Court’s failure to recognize the
exceptional nature of the wiretap in its ruling. Electronic
eavesdropping, first employed by law enforcement in the 1890s,
disrupted the balance of Fourth Amendment protection by allowing
law enforcement access to information it was unable to previously
retrieve without a warrant.371 However, it took the Supreme Court
367

See id.
See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928).
369
Id. at 457.
370
See Milligan, supra note 275, at 1323.
371
William Lee Adams, Brief History: Wiretapping, TIME (Oct. 11, 2010),
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2022653,00.html
[https://perma.cc/6C4U-DRVX]; Michael Pollack, A Short History of
368
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another seventy years to properly tighten Fourth Amendment
scrutiny to account for this imbalance.372
To continue, in cell-phone cases before 2014, only one
dimension of a smart-phone—its functionality—was typically
discussed.373 Since cell-phones disrupted the Fourth Amendment
equilibrium, rendering them exceptional,374 engaging in an analysis
solely focused on their function is gravely under-inclusive.
Further, in the context of the Riley case, if the Court applied a
mono-analogical approach, premised on the idea that a cell phone
functions like an address book or other pre-digital tool, a
warrantless search incident to arrest would be lawful.375 Moreover,
in the context of the Carpenter case, if CSLI records functioned as
business records, like the bank records at issue in Miller, their
warrantless search would be lawful under the third-party
doctrine.376
2. Poly-Analogical Reasoning
To combat the under-inclusiveness of mono-analogical
reasoning, this Note proposes that courts employ a holistic, “polyanalogical” approach. Such an approach invites courts to reflect on
the practical implications of a new technology, beyond its mere
function. A technology’s non-functional dimensions may include
frequency of use, storage capacity, efficiency, and ability to

Wiretapping,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
28,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/01/nyregion/a-short-history-ofwiretapping.html [https://perma.cc/PNW2-KMH5].
372
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (overruling Olmstead).
373
See People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 507–08 (Cal. 2011), abrogated by Riley
v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (“[N]either defendant nor the dissent
persuasively explains why the sheer quantity of personal information should
be determinative. Even ‘small spatial container[s]’ that hold less information
than cell phones may contain highly personal, intimate and private information,
such as photographs, letters, or diaries.”).
374
See infra Part I.C.
375
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014); cf. United States v.
Runyan, 290 F.3d 223, 236 (5th Cir. 2002) (analogizing the search of floppy
disks and CDs to opening a closed container). See generally Milligan, supra
note 275.
376
See generally Milligan, supra note 275.
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aggregate information.377 Justice Roberts, in Carpenter, delineated
three non-functional factors to help guide a court assessing the role
of an exceptional technology in pre-existing doctrine.378 These
factors are aimed not at the technology’s function, but the nature of
the information targeted.379
The following sub-part will discuss the Court’s poly-analogical
approach to smart-phone cases in Riley and Carpenter. Although
Justice Roberts did not specifically address the three
aforementioned factors until Carpenter, they were eluded to, and
guided the Court’s reasoning, in Riley.
3. Riley, Carpenter, and Poly-Analogical Analysis in Action
Chief Justice Robert’s reasoning in Riley and Carpenter
exemplify the Court’s response to technological exceptionalism,
and its attempt to restore the Fourth Amendment to a state of
equilibrium.380 To elaborate, the Court first identified the
exceptional nature of the technology at issue by assessing its
impact on the balance of power between police and individual
privacy. Then it rejected conventional analogies in light of the
technology’s exceptionalism, focusing on both the function of the
smart-phone on its non-functional dimensions. Finally, it engaged
in a holistic analysis to ascertain the propriety of applying the
search incident to lawful arrest and third-party doctrines to a smart
phone, and CSLI, respectively.381
4. Riley Declines to Extend the Search Incident to Lawful
Arrest Doctrine to a Smart Phone on Arrestee’s Person
A poly-analogical approach was employed by Justice Robert’s
in the majority opinion of Riley.382 In Riley, the government
attempted to analogize searching an arrestee’s cell phone to
377

Id. at 1320.
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018) (emphasizing (1)
“the deeply revealing nature” of the information retrieved, (2) the information’s
“depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach,” and (3) “the inescapable and
automatic nature of its collection”).
379
See id.
380
See generally Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206; Riley, 134 S. Ct. 2473.
381
See cases cited supra note 380.
382
See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485.
378
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searching a carton of cigarettes, address book, wallet, or purse,
incident to arrest.383 Roberts sternly rejected this argument, holding
that inspecting the contents of an arrestee’s pockets does not
substantially intrude on an arrestee’s privacy beyond the arrest
itself when a physical item is searched, but, “any extension of that
reasoning to digital data has to rest on its own bottom.”384
Moreover, Roberts analyzed a cell phone’s non-functional
dimensions, ultimately rejecting the government’s attempt to liken
a smartphone to pre-digital items.
First, a cell phone has immense storage capacity.385 A cellphone can store the equivalent of “millions of pages of text,”
dating back to the purchase of the phone, or even earlier.386 Next,
cell-phone data can be aggregated.387 A cell phone collects in one
place many distinct types of information—“an address, a note, a
prescription, a bank statement, a video—that reveal much more in
combination than any isolated record.”388 Additionally, the Court
discussed the pervasive nature of the smart phone.389 “Prior to the
digital age, people did not typically carry a cache of sensitive
personal information with them as they went about their day.”390
However, as of 2013, nearly three quarters of smart phone users
reported being within five feet of their phones most of the time,
while 12% of users admitted to using their phones in the shower.391
Justice Roberts sarcastically notes that “[cell phones] are now such
a pervasive and insistent part of daily life that the proverbial visitor

383
In Riley, the government argued that searching all the data on an arrestee’s
cell phone was “materially indistinguishable” from searches of physical items
such as an address book, wallet, or purse. Justice Roberts, in response, reasoned
that “[t]hat is like saying a ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable
from a flight to the moon. Both are ways of getting from point A to point B, but
little else justifies lumping them together.” Id. at 2488.
384
Id. at 2489.
385
Id.; see Milligan, supra note 275, at 1320.
386
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489.
387
See id.
388
Id.
389
Id. at 2490.
390
Id.
391
Id.
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from Mars might conclude they were an important feature of
human anatomy.”392
The Riley Court expressly rejected both the government’s
proposed mono-analogical approach,393 and the previously
categorical rule of United States v. Robinson that a warrantless
search incident to arrest is presumptively lawful.394
5. Carpenter Declines to Extend the Third-Party Doctrine to
CSLI Held by a Private Wireless Carrier
Chief Justice Roberts, in his majority opinion, isolates three
specific factors to help guide a court’s analysis of an exceptional
technology.395 To begin, the Court explained that information that
is “deeply revealing” of some private quality of the person under
surveillance warrants protection.396 Quoting Justice Sotomayor’s
concurrence in Jones, the Court addressed how location
information reveals more than someone’s movements, but through
them, the individual’s “familial, political, professional, religious,
and sexual associations.”397 This factor highlights the connection
between the intimate nature of the data at issue, and a person’s
Fourth Amendment right over that data.398 The Carpenter Court
found that time stamped CSLI, similar to GPS information,
provided an intimate window into a person’s life and was thus,
392

Id. at 2484.
“And to make matters worse, such an analogue test would allow law
enforcement to search a range of items contained on a phone, even though
people would be unlikely to carry such a variety of information in physical
form. . . . [I]t is implausible that [a citizen] would have strolled around with
video tapes, photo albums, and an address book all crammed into his pockets.
But because, each of those items has a pre-digital analogue, [the government
argues] police…would be able to search a phone for all those items—a
significant diminution of privacy.” Id. at 2493.
394
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973).
395
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018).
396
Id.
397
Id. at 2217.
398
The connection between the intimacy of information and one’s expectation
of privacy over the information is not new. Professor Orin Kerr’s “private facts”
model of Fourth Amendment protection centers on the sensitivity and intimacy
of the information obtained. Freiwald’s intrusiveness factor also determines the
intimacy of the information revealed by the surveillance technique at issue. See
Ohm, supra note 131, at 14.
393
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“deeply revealing.”399 This factor, which is arguably the most
important,400 considering the Court held that CSLI “hold[s] for
many Americans the ‘privacies of life,’” cut in favor of finding a
search had occurred.401
The second factor highlights the Court’s willingness to protect
information that possesses “depth, breadth, and comprehensive
reach.”402 Professor Ohm breaks this requirement down into three
discrete measures.403 “Depth” refers to the detail and precision of
the information stored.404 “Breadth” refers to the frequency and
length of data collection.405 Finally, “comprehension” refers to the
number of people tracked by the database.406
The Court found that CSLI possessed depth, breadth, and a
comprehensive reach, emphasizing that CSLI contains “the whole
of [a person’s] physical movements” and a “detailed chronicle of a
person’s physical presence.”407 The depth factor, similar to the
“deeply revealing” factor cut in favor of finding the Fourth
Amendment was implicated, due CSLI’s precision.408 Since CSLI
can place an individual inside a place of worship, a storefront, their
home, and other revealing locations, the “depth” factor cuts toward
the need for a warrant.409
Additionally, CSLI is invasive due to its breadth.410 The
database at issue in Carpenter stored “an average of 101 data
points” daily, and, most wireless carriers store CSLI for five
years.411 Roberts emphasizes this point in discussing how a person
may be effectively “tailed,” far before law enforcement has any

399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217, 2223.
Ohm, supra note 131, at 13.
See id.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223.
Ohm, supra note 131, at 14–15.
Id. at 15.
Id.
Id.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219–20.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 2223.
Id. at 2209, 2218.

1306

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXIX:1243

suspicion that they have committed a crime.412 He notes that
“[w]hoever the suspect turns out to be, he has effectively been
tailed every moment of every day for five years, and the police
may—in the Government’s view—call upon the results of that
surveillance without regard to the constraints of the Fourth
Amendment.”413
As for comprehensive reach, the Court determined that, since
“location information is continually logged for all of the 400
million devices in the United States—not just those belonging to
persons who might happen to come under investigation—this
newfound tracking capacity runs against everyone.”414
Finally, the Carpenter majority looked to the “inescapable and
automatic nature” of how the information is collected.415 This
factor can also be split into two discrete inquiries.416 First, the
Court looked to the whether the surveillance was “inescapable.”417
The majority implicitly embraced petitioner’s argument that
cellphones have become such a pervasive part of modern life that
their use cannot be considered “voluntary,”—or put differently,
“escapable.”418 Whether one needs to use the service at issue “to be
a functioning member of modern society” speaks to one of the
underlying theories of the third-party doctrine—the extent to which
the target of collection voluntarily exposed such information to a
private party.419 The majority in Carpenter determined this factor
cut in favor of protection. Citing Riley, the Court held that cell
phones are “such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life that
carrying one is indispensable to participation in modern

412

Id. at 2218.
Id.
414
Id.
415
Id. at 2223.
416
Ohm, supra note 131, at 19.
417
See id. at 19–21.
418
Brief for Petitioner, at 39–42, Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (No. 16-402).
419
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (“Apart from disconnecting the phone from
the network, there is no way to avoid leaving behind a trail of location data. As a
result, in no meaningful sense does the user voluntarily ‘assume the risk’ of
turning over a comprehensive dossier of his physical movements.”).
413
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society.”420 Thus, a cellphone user cannot be said to voluntarily
assume the risk of turning over their location data to a service
provider in a meaningful way.421
In contrast to inescapability, the automatic nature of a
surveillance method corresponds to an individual’s ability to “optout” of having their data collected.422 CSLI is automatic because
location records are generated whenever an individual uses their
phone, and there is no ability for the user to “opt-out” of having
their location chronicled.423
III. ASSESSING HASH-VALUE MATCHING AND THE PRIVATE AND
BINARY SEARCH DOCTRINES AFTER CARPENTER
“When confronting new concerns wrought by
digital technology, this Court has been careful not
to uncritically extend existing precedents.”424
As discussed above, a technology is exceptional if it is
qualitatively different from others in the same general category.425
To determine technological exceptionalism, this Note asks
420

Id. at 2210; see also Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014).
Unlike the bugged container in Knotts or the car in Jones, a cell phone—almost
a “feature of human anatomy,”—tracks nearly exactly the movements of its
owner. While individuals regularly leave their vehicles, they compulsively carry
cell phones with them all the time. A cell phone faithfully follows its owner
beyond public thoroughfares and into private residences, doctor’s offices,
political headquarters, and other potentially revealing locales. Id. at 2490 (noting
that “nearly three-quarters of smart phone users report being within five feet of
their phones most of the time, with 12% admitting that they even use their
phones in the shower.”).
421
See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
422
Ohm, supra note 131, at 20.
423
Id. “[A] cell phone logs a cell-site record by dint of its operation, without
any affirmative act on the part of the user beyond powering up. Virtually any
activity on the phone generates CSLI, including incoming calls, texts, or e-mails
and countless other data connections that a phone automatically makes when
checking for news, weather, or social media updates. Apart from disconnecting
the phone from the network, there is no way to avoid leaving behind a trail of
location data. As a result, in no meaningful sense does the user voluntarily
‘assume[] the risk’ of turning over a comprehensive dossier of his physical
movements.” Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
424
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2222.
425
See supra Part I.A.

1308

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXIX:1243

whether, in relation to other surveillance techniques in the same
category, hashing meaningfully disrupts the balance of power
between law enforcement and individuals.
Positing that hashing belongs to the general category of
techniques that authenticate data in the binary, this Part first
assesses whether hashing makes binary authentication of data
“much less expensive” than other techniques of its kind—
specifically, canine sniffs and narcotics field tests. If this question
is answered in the affirmative, this Note will conclude that hashing
causes a rights-shift; which meaningfully disrupts the current
balance of Fourth Amendment power. Moreover, if determined to
be exceptional, this Note proposes that courts should decline to
analogize hashing to pre-digital technologies, and instead employ a
holistic analysis of hashing’s functional and non-functional
attributes when assessing its fit within established doctrine.
A. Surveillance Techniques that Reveal Information in the Binary
Hash-value matching to detect contraband falls into the
category of surveillance techniques that reveal only the presence
(or absence) of contraband. This Section explores two commonly
used binary authentication techniques. First, it assesses law
enforcement’s use of canine sniffs, at issue in the Place line of
cases.426 Second, it analyzes field tests for narcotics, at issue in
Jacobsen and its progeny.427
1. Canine Sniffs
Canines are widely used “volatile organic compound”428
detectors, often employed to detect the presence of narcotics and

426

See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005); Indianapolis v. Edmond,
531 U.S. 32, 35 (2000); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983); see
also supra Part I.C.4.
427
See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 112 (1984).
428
A compound is described as “volatile” if it evaporates easily, releasing
molecules into the atmosphere. What Is a Volatile Organic Compound, ION SCI.,
https://www.ionscience.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/What-is-a-VOCTOFU-V1.0-UK.pdf [https://perma.cc/PTJ4-8JF8] (last visited Jan. 31, 2019).
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explosives.429 Many illicit substances, including amphetamines,
cocaine, and heroin release compounds into the air that a properly
trained canine can detect.430 Upon detecting the compound, the
canine will alert their handler to where it smells the drug.431
Canines are recognized as the most mobile, flexible, fast, and
durable real-time detectors of narcotics and explosives.432
However, canine sniffs are quite costly, for several reasons.
First, they are fallible, leading to false positives. The detection of a
false positive is costly because it requires further testing and
subsequent litigation. The accuracy of a canine sniff is measured
by both the proportion of correct “hits,” (when a canine detects the
presence of a drug), and the proportion of “false alerts,” (when the
canine incorrectly indicates the presence of a drug).433 A perfectly
429

Tadeusz Jezierski et al., Information-Seeking Behaviour of Sniffer Dogs
During Match-to-Sample Training in the Scent Lineup, 39 POLISH PSYCHOL.
BULL. 71, 71 (2008).
430
See
generally
Ed
Grabianowski, How
Police
Dogs
Work,
HOWSTUFFWORKS (May 3, 2004), https://people.howstuffworks.com/policedog.htm [https://perma.cc/R54A-N9K3] (describing the process of training
canines, whose sense of smell is almost fifty times as sensitive as a human’s, to
ferret out various narcotics); cf. Tadeusz Jezierski et al., Efficacy of Drug
Detection by Fully Trained Police Dogs Varies by Breed, Training Level, Type
of Drug, and Search Environment, 237 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 112, 114 (2014)
(comparing the relative ease with which trained dogs can detect marijuana,
amphetamine, cocaine, and heroin). Police dogs are typically trained by first
being presented with a white, odorless towel. After the dog has played with the
towel, and views it as a toy, its handler will wrap an illicit substance inside the
towel. The dog will then begin to associate the smell of the substance with its
toy. After this, the handler will hide the towel, with the substance, in various
places. When the dog smells its toy—the substance—it will dig and scratch at
the area to alert its handler that it has found its toy. Grabianowski, supra note
431, at 4.
431
Karl Smallwood, How Do They Train Drug Sniffing Dogs?,
(Jan.
19,
2018),
TODAYIFOUNDOUT
http://www.todayifoundout.com/index.php/2018/01/how-do-they-train-drugsniffing-dogs/ [https://perma.cc/73FJ-F9RD]. Once a dog has learned to
successfully seek out a smell when commanded, the trainer conditions the dog to
engage in an appropriate action to alert him to the smell. Id. For example, some
drug detecting dogs are trained to paw at the spot where the illegal substance is
located. Id.
432
See, e.g., Jezierski et al., supra note 430, at 112; Burkhard Bilger, Beware
of the Dogs, NEW YORKER (Feb. 27, 2012) https://www.newyorker.com
/magazine/2012/02/27/beware-of-the-dogs [https://perma.cc/8UFX-CB4N].
433
Id. at 113.
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accurate canine sniff would guarantee that no target material
remains undetected, and no other materials than the target are
falsely indicated by the canine.434
A canine may not be able to detect contraband for a variety of
reasons. First, canines are not always trained in similar enough
circumstances to the ones they encounter in the real world.435 For
example, a canine who can detect as little as a trillionth of a gram
of a narcotic in a spare basement room, will likely not produce the
same results in a crowd of people, a windy environment, or if the
narcotic is moving with an individual.436 Moreover, a canine may
not be able to get close enough to the target material to detect its
presence—especially if the target is moving. Additionally, canines
tire out.437 A canine that is overheated, or panting for another
reason, has a less reliable nose.438 A 2013 study involving 1219
canines showed that canines missed target material 5% of the time
amphetamine was sought; 12.6% of the time cocaine was sought;
and 12% of the time heroin was sought.439
False alerts occur due to the aforementioned fallibilities of the
canines, as well as errors by handlers, and the pervasive
contamination of currency by cocaine.440 In rejecting evidence that
a canine detected narcotics on a defendant, courts have noted that
“a substantial portion of United States currency . . . is tainted with
sufficient traces of controlled substances to cause a trained canine
434

See id.
Alexandra Horowitz, The Limits of Detection, THE NEW YORKER,
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-limits-of-detection
[https://perma.cc/YGX3-HHGT] (Apr. 24, 2013).
436
Id.
437
See id.
438
Id.
439
Jezierski et al., supra note 430, at 114. The above results come from a 2013
study conducted by the Institute of Genetics and Animal Breeding of Polish
Academy Sciences, Department of Animal Behavior. The trial included 1219
experimental searching tests; 440 were performed by German Shepherds, 517 by
Labrador retrievers, 203 by Terriers, and 59 by Cocker Spaniels. On a single
day, no more than two searching tests were conducted by any dog. If two
searching tests were conducted on a specific day for one dog, the second test
was done in a separate room. The dogs and their handlers waited in another
building until they were asked to come in for their trial. Id.
440
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 411–12 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting).
435
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to alert to their presence” and because as much of 80% of all
currency in circulation contains drug residue, a dog alert is of
“little value.”441
Additionally, it is expensive for law enforcement to train and
use canines. It costs law enforcement about $15,000 to train a team
of fourteen canines.442 Purchasing a single trained canine will cost
between $5,000 and $25,000.443 These metrics do not even
consider the cost of paying the handler’s salary—who will often
have to work early mornings and late nights to continuously train
the canine.444
2. Narcotics Colorimetric (Spot) Test
Chemical field tests are an “illicit drug identification technique
commonly used by law enforcement, border security personnel,
and forensic laboratories” to detect the presence of narcotics.445
Suspected illicit materials seized by police are often analyzed on
the spot to determine if an illegal drug is present.446 Although the
government uses a range of analytical techniques to determine the
existence of narcotics, the most commonly used is a colorimetric
(“spot”) test.447 During a spot test, an examiner adds a chemical
441

United States v. $242,484.00, 351 F.3d 499, 511 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting
that because as much as 80% of all currency in circulation contains drug residue,
a dog alert “is of little value”), vacated on other grounds by reh’g en banc, 357
F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2004); see also United States v. Carr, 25 F.3d 1194, 1214–
17 (3d Cir. 1994) (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“[A] substantial portion of United States currency . . . is tainted with sufficient
traces of controlled substances to cause a trained canine to alert to their
presence.”); Caballes, 543 U.S. at 412.
442
Michael Von Fremd, Intense Training for Bomb-Sniffing Dogs, ABC NEWS
(Jan. 12, 2012) https://abcnews.go.com/WNT/story?id=130545&page=1
[https://perma.cc/3545-3ZCE].
443
How Do You Train a Dog to Sniff Bombs?, PRICEONOMICS (Dec. 31, 2015),
https://priceonomics.com/how-do-you-train-a-dog-to-sniff-bombs/
[https://perma.cc/2YYA-M2NC].
444
Id.
445
Morgan Philp & Shanlin Fu, A Review of Chemical ‘Spot’ Tests: A
Presumptive Illicit Drug Identification Technique, 10 DRUG TESTING &
ANALYSIS 95, 95 (2018).
446
Id.
447
Id. Further, pursuant to evidentiary authentication requirements, a positive
spot test will be followed by laboratory testing using a more precise method,
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reagent to a sample of the seized material and observes any
changes in color. Specified color changes indicate the presence of
a particular class of compounds—such as amphetamines.448
A 2018 study by the National Institute of Justice (“NIJ”)
indicated that the average total cost of performing a color spot test
is $166.98 per sample tested.449 Moreover, the National Criminal
Justice Reference Service is proposing the introduction of portable
mass spectrometric instruments, which are more precise than the
current spot tests, and would cut costs by ensuring only probative
samples are re-tested in the laboratory.450
However, despite the relatively low costs of narcotics spot
tests, they have a high error rate, resulting in subsequent litigation
and retesting costs.451 Additionally, more precise methods are far
more expensive and timely to employ.452 Color tests are imperfect
because of their inherently subjective nature.453 A police officer,
with just hours of training from another officer who knows the

such as chromatography or mass spectrometry. Prasant Potuluri, Drug
TECH.
MAG.,
Identification
in
Law
Enforcement,
EVIDENCE
http://www.evidencemagazine.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=vie
w&id=1260&Itemid=49 [https://perma.cc/87EJ-PQM2] (last visited Jan. 31,
2019).
448
Philp & Fu, supra note 445, at 96.
449
Christopher C. Mulligan et al., Analytical Validation and Impact
Assessment of On-Site Evidence Screening via Ambient Sampling, Portable
Mass Spectometry, NAT’L CRIM. JUST. REFERENCE SERV. 8 (2018),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/251910.pdf
[https://perma.cc/396JFN4E]. This metric includes the on-site, precinct, transportation, in-laboratory,
and fixed costs of testing a single sample. Id.
450
Id. at 9–10.
451
See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 412 (2005) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (“[t]he infallible dog [] is a creature of legal fiction. . . . [T]heir
supposed infallibility is belied by judicial opinions describing well-trained
animals sniffing and alerting with less than perfect accuracy, whether owing to
errors by their handlers, the limitations of the dogs themselves, or even the
pervasive contamination of currency by cocaine.)
452
See id. at 56. The cost of a mass spectrometer, the most precise way to test
for narcotics, can cost up to $1,000,000. Id. at 54 (graphing the relative costs of
various analytical techniques to detect narcotics and determining color spot tests
are the least costly method, but also the least accurate).
453
See id. at 60.
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technique, can perform a spot test and determine its result.454
Further, these tests are only done when law enforcement believes
the substance they are testing is illicit. Thus, the tests are always
done in anticipation of criminal litigation—which makes their
subjective nature more worrisome. In addition, although color tests
can identify the most common drugs of abuse, there are limitations
on what can be detected.455 Color tests can only identify previously
characterized drugs, which creates an issue due to the growing
number of new psychoactive substances (“NPS”).456 There are a
significant number of NPS on the market, including Fentanyl and
other synthetic opioid derivatives, that color testing cannot
identify.457
B. Hash-Value Matching is Exceptional
Hash-value matching is qualitatively different from other types
of binary authentication, such as canine sniffs and spot tests.458
Other types of binary authentication methods are conducted after
the government has an articulable suspicion of criminal
wrongdoing.459 Alternatively, every internet communication is
hashed, without any suspicion.460 Second, hashing is conducted by
a private entity, at no cost to the government.461 Under Bankston
and Soltani’s theory, it is thus much less costly than other methods
of its kind.462 Therefore, the collection of hash-evidence causes a
454
See id. There have been significantly more NPS on the market, shown by a
statistic from the EU that a NPS was reported to their Early Warning System
every week in 2016. Fentanyl and other synthetic opioid derivatives remain
extremely dangerous public safety threats, particularly in the United States
where 167 kilograms of illicit fentanyl was seized in 2015. Other seized
substances include tryptamines, anesthetics, steroids, benzodiazepines, and
hallucinogens. Philp & Fu, supra note 445, at 95.
455
456
457

458

Philp & Fu, supra note 445, at 95.
Id.
See id.

See supra Part I.A.
See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 111–12 (1984); United
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 698 (1983).
460
See supra Part I.A.
461
See supra Part I.A.
462
See generally Bankston & Soltani, supra note 315, at 350–56. Compare id.
with Parts III.A.1–III.A.2 (discussing how a colorimetric spot test costs
approximately $166—without accounting for subsequent testing and litigation
459

1314

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXIX:1243

rights-shift and erodes a structural right to be free from pervasive
monitoring.463 This rights-shift tips the Fourth Amendment balance
toward the government. Hashing is thus an exceptional technology
which “supports a break with judicial precedent.”464
1. Hashing is Non-Targeted
The fundamental difference between hashing and other binary
authentication methods is that hashing is automatic, non-targeted,
and cannot be avoided by any internet user.465 Further, hashing
occurs before the government has any reason to believe criminal
activity is afoot. Every image transmitted via an ECSP is hashed
without an individualized suspicion of its sender or recipient. This
renders hashing unlike, and significantly more invasive, than other
techniques of its kind.
By contrast, individual property is only subject to canine sniffs
or spot tests—other forms of binary authentication—after the
government has an articulable suspicion that a specific person has
committed a crime. In fact, the Place majority, in articulating that
probable cause was not required for a canine sniff, concluded that
“the principles of Terry and its progeny” allowed the officer to
briefly detain luggage to expose it to a canine sniff, “to investigate
the circumstances that aroused his suspicion.”466 Similarly, the
Jacobsen Court predicated its acceptance of a warrantless spot test
for cocaine on the fact that the agent already had a reasonable
suspicion for the test, and that there was a high probability that the
suspect possessed contraband.467 Thus, warrantless canine sniffs
and spot tests are legally justified because they are discerning,
targeted, and typically do not effect individuals unless they are
suspected of a crime.468 Canine sniffs are employed in response to
fees associated with mistakes and how a trained canine costs between $5,000–
$25,000).
463
See Surden, supra note 320, at 1618.
464
Ohm, supra note 131, at 39.
465
See supra Part I.A.
466
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706 (1983) (emphasis added).
467
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122 (1984) (“The field test at issue
could disclose only one fact previously unknown to the agent—whether or not a
suspicious white powder was cocaine.” (emphasis added)).
468
See generally, e.g., Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109; Place, 462 U.S. 696.
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a specific threat, or in certain locations, such as borders or
airports.469 Thus, if an individual wants to avoid a narcoticssniffing dog, they could plausibly do so. Spot tests are used after a
suspect has been identified, a substance has been seized from them,
and the government suspects that substance is contraband. Like
canine sniffs, spot tests are neither common nor pervasive.
2. Hashing is Less Costly Than Other Binary Authentication
Methods
Private ECSPs install hash-value matching software on their
own volition.470 Thus, the government does not spend any money
to participate in an evidence gathering dynamic with ECSPs.471
Since the PROTECT Act requires ECSPs with actual knowledge of
child abuse images to disclose these contraband images to law
enforcement, matching hash-values are reported directly to the
government.472 Moreover, other types of consumer data are readily
available for government acquisition via a § 2703(d) subpoena.
The statutory framework regulating the collection and sharing of
consumer data is porous, allowing the government to routinely
obtain related consumer data, at no cost, and without an onerous
showing of suspicion.473
Finally, hash-value matching’s error rate is practically zero.474
Therefore, the cost of subsequent litigation due to false hits is nonexistent.475 In sum, hashing software allows law enforcement a
cost-free route to “sniff-out” digital contraband sent by any
469

See Jerierski et al., supra note 435, at 112.
Id.; United States v. Miller, No. 16-47-DLB-CJS, 2017 WL 2705963, at *1
(E.D. Ky. June 23, 2017) (Google has been using its proprietary hashing
software since 2008, specifically to assist in the interception of online child
abuse images).
471
See supra Part I.A.
472
See supra Part I.A.2.
473
See supra Part I.A.3. Both doctrines rely on the idea that “[a] private search
extinguishes an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the object
searched.” See e.g., Adams, supra note 186, at 1–2. In both circumstances,
courts have held that once frustration of an individual’s expectation of privacy
occurs by a private actor, the Fourth Amendments does not prohibit
governmental use of the now “non-private information.” Id. at 2.
474
See supra Part I.A.
475
See supra Part I.A.
470
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individual over the internet, without a particularized suspicion of
wrongdoing. Additionally, courts have not scrutinized hashing due
to its binary nature—despite the fact it allows for pervasive
monitoring that was unthinkable at the time Place was decided.476
Thus, hashing software has caused a rights-shift, eroding the
structural privacy right to be free from pervasive government
monitoring. This rights-shift has tilted the Fourth Amendment
balance toward law enforcement. Under the framework proposed
by this Note, hashing is therefore an “exceptional” technology.
C. How Will Hashing Be Treated by the Post-Carpenter
Framework?
1. A Fourth Amendment Inquiry will not be Foreclosed Due
to Hashing’s Binary Nature
The binary search doctrine focuses on the surveillance
technique used by law enforcement, as opposed to the information
targeted.477 Thus, applying the binary search doctrine to an
exceptional technique runs afoul of Carpenter’s test, which
specifically addresses the class of information collected.478
Moreover, Carpenter implicitly addressed a frightening possibility
of the binary search doctrine: the more tailored an investigative
technique is to detecting contraband, the less the public can
reasonably expect the law to protect them against government
intrusions.479 This possibility is why the Carpenter court chose to
aim its analysis at the class of information collected.480 Since
surveillance techniques are becoming even more tailored and
efficient, the Court attempted to adjust the resulting Fourth
Amendment imbalance by departing from an analysis aimed at the
techniques; and instead addressing the information they seek.

476

United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (“[T]he canine sniff is sui
generis. We are aware of no other investigative procedure that is so limited both
in the manner in which the information is obtained and in the content of
the information revealed by the procedure.”).
477
See id.
478
See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018).
479
See id. at 2219.
480
See id. at 2216–17.
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2. A Fourth Amendment Analysis will not be Automatically
Foreclosed by an ECSP’s Private Search
Carpenter’s treatment of the third-party doctrine will guide the
Court’s treatment of the private search doctrine, a subset of the
former. Since hashing is “exceptional,” courts should decline to
analogize it to pre-digital technologies, such as dog sniffs or spot
tests, when assessing whether the private search doctrine
forecloses a constitutional inquiry into the government’s actions.
The Carpenter majority endorsed a “poly-analogical” approach to
exceptional technologies in lieu of a traditional, REP analysis.
Therefore, although an ECSP “searches” user data before law
enforcement, in the same way that a wireless carrier views CSLIevidence before law enforcement, the private intermediary will not
necessarily foreclose an inquiry into the constitutionality of law
enforcement’s warrantless search of hash evidence.
3. The Court Will Apply the Carpenter Factors to the Class of
Information Sought
Moreover, due to the parallel reasoning underlying the private
search and third-party doctrines; the applicability of the private
search doctrine to hashing can be neatly analyzed via the three
factors posed in Carpenter.481 As a preliminary matter, under
Carpenter, the Court will tailor these inquiries toward the type of
information sought by the technology at issue. With hash-value
matching, the information sought is contraband images contained
within digital communications.
Like other binary authentication methods, the class of
information sought in hashing cases traditionally prompts a
reviewing court to adopt an innocence theory of Fourth
Amendment rights. Since hashing, by its nature, only reveals
contraband, it is tempting for a court to foreclose any further
inquiry into its constitutionality and deem such a method outside
the amendment’s scope. But, investigative techniques are only
becoming more tailored. We are heading toward a technological
era where Loewy’s divining rod will exist, and law enforcement

481

See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223; supra Part I.C.1.
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will be able to scan the physical world for evidence of
wrongdoing—drawing out only the guilty.
The Orwellian future made possible by technological
innovation underscores this Note’s proposal to apply a formalist
approach to binary authentication cases. That is not to say that
most binary authentication methods will violate the Fourth
Amendment. Likely, these methods will not constitute a search.
However, foreclosing an analysis based the technique’s ability to
target only the guilty creates a slippery slope, and could lead to
future governmental abuse.
Next, courts should recognize hashing’s “exceptional” nature
when deciding to apply a formalist approach to hashing cases. In
earlier binary authentication cases, a presumption of
constitutionality in binary search cases was more reasonable
because the government already possessed some amount of
individualized suspicion before performing the secondary privacy
invasion. By contrast, images are routinely hashed without any
suspicion at all. Thus, a reviewing court should note hashing’s
exceptional nature when applying the Carpenter factors.
First, contraband contained within digital communications is
“deeply revealing” under Justice Robert’s test. Even a single image
attached to an email may be of a deeply intimate nature. As
discussed by the Sixth Circuit in Warshak, “[s]ince the advent of
email . . . [p]eople are now able to send sensitive and intimate
information instantaneously. . . . [L]overs exchange sweet nothings
and businessmen swap ambitions plans, all with the click of a
mouse. . . .”482 The Warshak Court describes an email account as
“an account of its owner’s life,” access to which would give
government agents the ability to peer deeply into one’s most
intimate secrets. Thus, the deeply revealing information factor cuts
in favor of a warrant requirement.
Since the deeply revealing factor highlights the connection
between the intimate nature of the data at issue and a Fourth
Amendment right over that data, it is helpful to look at the
recognized right protecting the content of email communications.
482

United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 284 (6th Cir. 2010).

2019]

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT & HASH-VALUE MATCHING

1319

Before the early 2000s, individuals enjoyed a structural right to be
free from comprehensive monitoring of their emails contents—
which society reasonably expects the government will not engage
in. As technology advanced, and such monitoring became possible,
circuit courts intervened and expressly held that individuals had
Fourth Amendment rights over their email content. Hashing’s
disclosure of an image that precisely matches an image sent by a
user, reveals part of the email’s content to the government. Thus,
the deeply revealing nature factor cuts in favor of hashing
constituting a search.
The second factor highlights the Court’s willingness to protect
information that possesses “depth, breadth, and comprehensive
reach.”483 First, Robert’s depth factor is inapplicable to hashing
and does not cut in either direction. The Carpenter court referred
to depth to indicate the precision of an amalgamation of metadata.
By contrast, hashing reveals content data. Hashing is perfectly
“precise”—but not in the sense discussed by Justice Roberts.
Moreover, hashing likely does not fulfill the “breadth” factor.
Hashing, unlike digital location tracking, does not “store”
information on its users. Hashing software either indicates that a
user uploaded a matching, contraband, image, and further reviews
that image; or fails to find a match and allows the image to
metaphorically “flow” past the ISP’s bottleneck, to its intended
recipient. As for “comprehensive reach,” although every
communication flowing through an ISP is hashed, an ISP does not
use hashing software to track its users the way that wireless
carriers do via CSLI. Again, because hashing does not “store”
information on its users, its reach should not be considered
“comprehensive” in the Carpenter sense. Thus, the second factor
cuts against finding a search.
Finally, the Carpenter majority looked to the “inescapable and
automatic nature” of how the information is collected.484
Compliance with hashing software is an inescapable caveat of
using an ECSP, including having an email account. Email is
undoubtedly an indispensable part of the information age. Over the
483
484

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223.
Id.
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last decade, email has become “so pervasive that some persons
may consider [it] to be [an] essential means or necessary
instrument[] for self-expression, even self-identification.”485
Further, hashing is automatic and indiscriminate. One cannot “optout” of having their correspondences hashed if they choose to use
email services. For these reasons, the “inescapable and automatic
nature” factor cuts toward a warrant requirement for hash
evidence.
CONCLUSION
To conclude, this Note uses hash-value matching to exemplify
how information shared with an ECSP will be treated by the
Fourth Amendment in the digital age. It poses a new framework
for treating novel technologies and adopts an “equilibrium
adjustment” approach to the Fourth Amendment.486 This
framework first asks whether the technology is “exceptional,”
meaning it disrupts the current balance of power struck by the
Fourth Amendment.487 It proposes looking at whether the
technology causes a “rights-shift” to determine if the Fourth
Amendment balance has been disrupted; rendering a technology
exceptional.488 Moreover, it adopts Bankston and Soltani’s cost
centered approach to determining if a rights-shift occurred—which
looks at how much less a new technology costs compared to others
of its kind.489
This Note proposes that exceptional technologies should not be
analogized to their conventional predecessors.490 It analyzes and
recommends the Carpenter Court’s “poly-analogical,” holistic
approach to exceptional technologies.491 Finally, this Note assesses
whether hashing is an exceptional technology, and how the Courts
will treat warrantless hash-value matching after Carpenter.492
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
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